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
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- Some Demerits of Contemporary
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SOME DEMERITS OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY*

CLARENCE SCHRAG
University of Washington

Sociologists consistently maintain that their primary objective is the formulation and corroboration of theories and generalizations dealing with social phenomena. They often disagree, however, on the relative merits of alternative strategies that are directed toward the achievement of this objective. Two major areas of disagreement involve 1) the role of judgment and decision in scientific procedure and 2) the connection between theoretical and observational expressions.

The contention of this paper with respect to the problem areas mentioned is that progress in the accumulation of sociological knowledge has been impeded by certain traditions of radical empiricism and logical positivism. These traditions tend to discourage behavioral scientists from making the methodological and theoretical innovations that have been profitable in the more mature physical sciences where the narrow empiricist-positivist thesis has been largely abandoned. We conclude, therefore, that sociological inquiry would be greatly facilitated by revision of our philosophical orientation in line with trends being developed in some of the older disciplines.¹

Before attempting to justify this conclusion it may be advantageous to state some disclaimers in order to minimize irrelevant arguments. First, the prospects for a scientific sociology are not here in question. Indeed we share the optimistic expectations of most of our colleagues with respect to the growth and promise of our discipline. Let us concede, then, that nomothetic generalizations relating to human interaction and social organization can be established and that sociology may eventually gain recognition as a general science of social phenomena just as physics and biology, for instance, have already attained such stature within their respective domains of investigation.

Again, we are not opposed to a liberalized version of operationism such as that currently advocated by some phi-

losophers of science who had earlier adopted a much narrower definition.² If operationism refers to a methodological attitude that insists upon clarity in the use of rules for defining our terms and techniques, and if it applies not only to the methods of logic and mathematics but also to the procedures of observation and experiment, then operationism is, of course, synonymous with sound scientific strategy. The essential function of theories and generalizations is to enable us to anticipate or to explain the events in which we are interested, and arguments that have no testable implications fall outside the scope of empirical science.

Nor do we deny the beneficial historical influence exerted on research methods, especially in the behavioral disciplines, by radical empiricism and logical positivism. Perhaps to a greater extent than any other intellectual doctrine, these philosophical movements have been responsible for the creation of an embryo social science. They have been largely successful in liberating social inquiry from its entrapment by insoluble problems or untestable assumptions and in relegating these concerns to the realm of metaphysics.

But the rise of the empiricist-positivist orientation and the rejection of metaphysics seem also to have contributed to the aforementioned controversies regarding the adequacy of alternative scientific strategies. In particular, these developments have helped to foster the mechanistic notions that scientific inquiry is devoid of normative judgments, that the meanings of theoretical concepts are restricted to observed data, and that all there is to theory construction is the statement of verifiable relationships

* Presidential Address read at the annual meetings of the Pacific Sociological Association, April, 1961.

¹ The author wishes to thank George A. Lundberg for helpful suggestions in the preparation of this paper and in the examination of historical developments in empiricism and positivism.

² Relevant discussions of developments and revisions in empiricism and positivism are found in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, Vol. I, Ch. 1, and in Carl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, Vol. II, No. 7. If the Vienna Circle has helped to establish a mechanistic conception of science, it has also been instrumental in resolving the controversies created by that conception.

among observed variables. These views, to the extent that they are supported in contemporary sociology, merit careful examination in the light of current investigations into the procedures of empirical science.³

I. NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS AND STYLES OF INQUIRY

Many sociologists contend that their inquiries are or ought to be quite free from normative commitments, perhaps excepting those commitments that pertain to the identification of research problems, the selection of relevant data, and the establishment of fiducial boundaries for statistical decisions. They see science and social policy as having mutually exclusive if not contradictory aims. They are therefore inclined to distrust studies that have obvious implications for social action. It follows that scientific research, in order to avoid possible contamination by value judgments, should show little regard for its potential social or political utility. In general, the "purer" the science the less its concern for pragmatic applications. This, it appears, is the motto of the scientific extremists.⁴

Despite their skeptical attitude toward "action" research, however, the methodological purists frequently find it advisable to accept grants and awards from action-oriented agencies, public and private, that largely control access to a considerable share of our research funds and facilities. It seems reasonable to expect that such agencies will in the future exert even greater influence upon our research efforts. This is so because modern research is increasingly dependent upon the employment of high-cost data-processing equipment and the specialized services of experts in the formulation of research problems, theory construction, research design, data collection and analysis, and report writing, not to mention the specialists who are engaged primarily in administrative functions involving other workers and agencies. The division of labor characteristic of large scale investigations greatly increases the impact of research findings on community affairs and almost inevitably involves scientists in the formation of community policies. Sociologists may consequently find it more difficult and more important in the future to delineate properly their role as members of a scientific community

that seeks to unravel the empirical interconnections among social phenomena and their role as members of a political community that is interested in resolving social issues and guiding the course of social events.

Currently the purists tend to answer questions concerning the roles of the scientist and the citizen by arguing that funding agencies and/or political officials must assume responsibility for any policy decisions based on research findings. Moreover, they hold that since the researcher is paid for his services he is bound by the value commitments of his employer, at least to the extent that the employer, by virtue of his control over funds and facilities, can legitimately establish certain boundaries within which the scientist may be required to operate. Thus absolved of any culpability in the area of decision-making, the researcher can focus his energies on the scientific or relatively nonjudgmental aspects of his inquiry. Application of this pecuniary ethic supposedly enables the researcher to preserve his scientific objectivity and at the same time to fulfill his obligations to the fund source.

The preceding argument is based on a value judgment, namely, the idea that in order to perform his role properly the scientist should restrict his activities to the collection and analysis of factual data. It presumes that scientific achievement is largely independent of the conditions under which the scientist operates. But this is a dubious presumption. Certainly the quantity if not the quality of research, for instance, is appreciably affected by the policies of funding organizations. Evidence from demography, industrial sociology, and studies of mental health and deviant behavior, to mention only a few areas, suggests that recent scientific developments in the behavioral disciplines are in no small measure accreditable to the policies of public and private agencies that finance research activities. Far better demonstrations of the impact of administrative policies on scientific productivity are found in the physical sciences, particularly those dealing with atomic energy, missiles, and space exploration. It seems clear that cultural and social pressures are important determinants of scientific progress.

If administrative policies have an important influence on scientific trends and achievements, to what extent, then, should scientists become involved in the formulation of these policies? A fair guess is that greater involvement of qualified scientists would increase the likelihood of a substantial return for our research expenditures. Qualified scientists, in this case, would include experts on administrative problems as well as specialists in the different fields under investigation. No doubt administrative experts, because of the indeterminate theories found in their field at the present time, would frequently make their proposals in the form of hypotheses that are in need of corroboration by experience and observation. But this kind of test in the arena of community affairs is precisely what is required if

³ We will not attempt here to document the impact of empiricism and positivism on contemporary sociology but will focus our attention on the philosophical foundations of empirical science and their relevance to the field of sociology. See, for example, R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953; Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961; Gustav Bergmann, *Philosophy of Science*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957; Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, New York: Basic Books, 1959.

⁴ This conception of scientific purity is not restricted to the extreme empiricists, however. See, for example, Paul Hanly Furley, "Sociological Science and the Problems of Values," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, Evanston and White Plains: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959.

theories of social science are ever to achieve any high degree of confirmation. Furthermore, the status of the social scientist, instead of prohibiting him from becoming involved in matters of policy, should make him a prime prospect for employment whenever an organization is interested in evaluating its administrative programs and policies.⁵

The extreme purists of science tend to overestimate the degree of determinacy in well established generalizations or theories and to underestimate the role played by normative judgments and discretionary decisions in the accumulation of knowledge. Scientific inquiry, as well as community management, can profitably be viewed as a highly organized social institution which, like any other cooperative enterprise, is regulated at strategic points of decision by social norms and conventions.⁶ Some of these norms may be supported by overwhelming evidence, while others are primarily matters of choice or personal preference. Thus, the decisions of scientists, even on questions concerning formalized research design, are often founded on nothing more substantial than their personal preferences or the consent, that is, the normative prescriptions, of the scientific community.

Consider, for example, the widely varied styles of inquiry that are utilized by reputable researchers in any given field of investigation.⁷ Styles of inquiry are revealed in the decisions scientists make among various possible alternatives that occur at each stage of the research process. Perhaps the most important alternatives deal with research objectives, methods for selection and definition of variables to be observed, designs for observation and analysis of data, and rules for determining the structure of arguments and conclusions. Thus, the objective of research may be to test the adequacy of current claims and theories, or it may be to explore an uncertain area in order to formulate new explanatory principles and systems. Again, some studies aim at post facto explanations of observed events, while others strive to meet the requirements of prediction and control.

Variables under observation in a given study are frequently selected on the basis of current theories or previous research findings, but sometimes the researcher prefers to rely more heavily upon his own insight or intuition. The variables may be precisely defined, observed under rigidly controlled conditions, and recorded in terms of scalar units so as to insure high reliability; or they may be reported as they are observed in their "free state" on the assumption that generality and validity are more important than reliability for the purpose at hand. Likewise,

⁵ Many research organizations, public and private, already employ social scientists as administrative specialists, of course.

⁶ Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1952 examines science as a social institution.

⁷ Joseph J. Schwab, "What Do Scientists Do?" *Behavioral Science*, 5 (January 1960), 1-27.

research designs may be specified in such detail that the methods of observation, hypotheses, dummy tables, statistical operations, and confidence limits are fully established before the process of data collection begins. Other designs, however, are so fluid and flexible that decisions at any given point in the research process are primarily determined by information gathered in the immediately preceding stages.

Possibly the most difficult decisions encountered in scientific inquiry are those relating to the nature of the concluding arguments that digest the research findings and place them in proper context with respect to prevailing theories and generalizations. Some workers, assuming a Comtean hierarchy of science, try to link their concepts and findings with those of the more mature disciplines by means of some sort of analogy; others disavow such analogy and attempt to develop explanations that are unique to their own field. Again, research findings may be formalized in the language of logic and mathematics by means of concepts and theories that are only partly and indirectly connected with the data of observation. In other cases, however, theoretical concepts are minimized and findings are expressed simply as empirical relations between directly observed variables. Numerous other points of disagreement can be noted in the explanatory systems employed by contemporary researchers.

Questions of strategy such as those mentioned above are frequently resolved in terms of personal preference or social precedent. Only rarely can an issue be stated in a manner amenable to experimental investigation. Consequently, decisions that are confidently made in a given discipline at a specified time are rejected at another time or in a different discipline. Controversy is the rule, especially in the social or behavioral sciences. The most striking feature of such controversy is that the opponents almost always imply that the question at issue is a matter of factual evidence rather than one involving judgment and discretion. Our conclusion is that, contrary to the contentions of the extreme purists, some of the crucial questions of research strategy, such as those mentioned, cannot be answered by inexorable logic or by verified principles of method.⁸ Bold innovations and judgments based on shared experience are essential tools of the research worker.

⁸ Note, by way of illustration, the controversy between Hanan C. Selvin and Robert McGinnis, among others, regarding the use of tests of statistical significance. In general, Selvin is concerned with the empirical adequacy of such tests and with certain common errors in their interpretation, while McGinnis demonstrates the logical or syntactical adequacy of the tests. Their heated communications produce little agreement because these writers are not concerned with the same problem. Hanan C. Selvin, "A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (October 1957), 519-527, and Robert McGinnis, "Randomization and Inference in Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (August 1958), 408-414.

This is not to say that one research strategy is necessarily as effective as another. No doubt some strategies are better suited than others for a given purpose. Our task, then, is to link alternative strategies and purposes in the most efficient manner suggested by the best obtainable evidence. The appropriate linking of strategies and objectives will inevitably entail a good deal of research on research methods and will also require researchers to make a more detailed specification of their problems and objectives. The first step, however, is for researchers to admit that objectives are relevant factors in the selection of methods and that information concerning the optimum connections between strategies and objectives is at present indeterminate.

The assumption that scientific inquiry is a relatively fixed and mechanical process has discouraged realistic investigation of alternative styles and strategies. Consequently, sociologists and other behavioral scientists have been inclined to disregard the contributions to methodology that could be made by examination of the social and psychological factors that have a significant bearing on research procedures. If normative judgments and social conventions are operative in certain phases of the research process, their investigation is as important to our knowledge of science as it is to our knowledge of any other social institution. Furthermore, the purity or warranted assertibility of research findings is not so much determined by their lack of relevance for social action as by the logical and empirical propriety of the various decisions made in the process of inquiry.⁹

There are nevertheless some phases of inquiry in which decisions can be made with a relatively high degree of assurance on the basis of available knowledge. We refer here to the syntax of argument and to some of the formal procedures of logic and mathematics that serve as a foundation for empirical inquiry.¹⁰ Certain minimal requirements for generalizations and theories have already been established, and progress in sociology will depend, in part, on our ability to meet these requirements. In this connection, however, some sociologists seem often to prefer vague and discursive treatments of their materials, treatments which enable them to claim contributions to

knowledge and understanding without taking into account the logical and empirical implications of their claims.

II. SOME PREREQUISITES FOR EXPLANATORY GENERALIZATIONS

That the meanings of concepts are restricted to observed data is a view strongly supported by the mechanistic conception of science. Surely the mysteries of nature can be unraveled, this view contends, if we but define our terms with sufficient precision and then measure the degree of association among the defined variables. Proponents of this view assert, in effect, that "intelligence or social status, etc., are what the tests measure" and that, in general, "different operations yield different concepts." Indeed some extremists seem to find guidance in Hayakawa's admonitions concerning the nonidentity of cows 1 and 2.¹¹

These scholars seem undismayed by the fact that empirical generalizations and theories always involve the statement of relations among disparate objects or events and that such statements cannot be achieved within a "thing language" that assigns a unique symbol to every distinctive observation. Returning to our bovine illustration, the process of generalization simply forces us to use some classificatory rule or definition in order to decide whether or not cow 1 is to be categorized with cow 2. Similar decisions regarding the significance of individual variations are always required in the process of generalization.

In addition, the effective employment of generalizations or theories requires that we make a clear and simple distinction between observational expressions, or descriptions, and explanatory arguments. Descriptions are restricted to reports of observations and to conjunctions and disjunctions among such reports. They may vary in the amount of information communicated and in their reliability, that is, in the degree to which the reports vary from one observation or observer to another. Regardless of their content or reliability, however, descriptions are never sufficient for explanation or prediction because they make no claims beyond the information given.

Explanations, on the other hand, always involve claims of fact that go beyond the data already reported. By means of logical inference or deduction, either probabilistic or deterministic, they aim at the statement of confirmable interconnections among classes of events, including events to be observed in the future as well as those reported in the past. Thus, among the premises of an explanatory argument there must always be at least one lawlike assumption having the general form: *If X is observed then it may be expected that Y also will be observed.* It is this lawlike

⁹ For a consideration of extrascientific influences and value judgments in scientific inquiry see Philipp Frank, *Philosophy of Science*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957. Some philosophers hold that value judgments are inevitably involved in all scientific decisions (e.g., in hypothesis testing). See especially R. Rudner, "The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments," *Philosophy of Science*, 20 (January 1953), 1-6; E. P. Wigner, "The Limits of Science," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. Note also Nelson Goodman, "The Revision of Philosophy," in Sidney Hook, ed., *American Philosophers at Work*, New York: Criterion Books, 1957, pp. 75-92.

¹⁰ See Bergmann, *op. cit.*, and Rudolf Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

¹¹ S. I. Hayakawa, *Language in Action*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945. For somewhat similar arguments see also Wendell Johnson, *People in Quandaries*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946, and A. Korzybski, *Science and Sanity*, Lancaster: Science Press, 1933.

assumption, this hypothetical regularity among events not yet reported, that primarily characterizes the process of explanation.

In sum, explanation involves procedures of inference and corroboration as well as those of definition and description. Interrelations among these procedures can be illustrated in the following paradigm:

$$\begin{array}{c} G_1, G_2, \dots G_n \\ C_1, C_2, \dots C_k \\ \hline E \end{array}$$

Here E represents a statement describing the phenomenon to be explained; $G_1, G_2, \dots G_n$ represent generalizations or law-like assumptions expressing regularities in the class of events of which E is a member; and $C_1, C_2, \dots C_k$ represent statements about the conditions under which the assumptions made in $G_1, G_2, \dots G_n$ may be expected to hold true.¹² It follows that G and C provide an explanation for the phenomenon in question if 1) E can be derived logically from G and C; if 2) the conditions stipulated in C are observed in the cases under investigation; and if 3) the assumptions in G are warranted by relevant evidence.¹³

Explanation therefore involves a combination of postulated regularities and observed conditions in the derivation of independently confirmable observation sentences. Successful explanations cannot be achieved by logical inference or empirical inquiry alone, but only by a judicious blending of observed fact and law-like supposition.

Systematic combinations of generalizations and observations are essential to all forms of inquiry in which explanation is involved. They are used in predictive sciences such as physics and chemistry, for example, where observations of specified conditions and applications of appropriate theories make possible the anticipation of future events. They are likewise necessary in such sciences as paleontology and zoology which are primarily concerned with the systematic organization of historical materials. Finally, applied sciences in fields of engineering and management also use explanations as a basis for altering the

course of events by means of appropriate modifications of conditions that have predictable consequences.

From the present perspective, the employment of sound methods of generalization and theory construction appears to be capable of achievement in historical and management disciplines as well as in predictive sciences. There are, to be sure, vast differences in these fields with respect to their state of knowledge, their techniques of inquiry, and the skills and attitudes of their research workers. Sometimes there are also important differences in the complexity of the tasks attempted. But the logical and, to a lesser extent, the empirical procedures of inquiry are gradually being refined and systematized, and it may be expected that valid inferences from reliable evidence will be utilized with increasing frequency in fields of knowledge now largely removed from the domain of science.¹⁴

Although corroboration of explanatory arguments ordinarily involves some experimentation, prospects for experimental investigation are also constantly increasing, especially in historical and management disciplines. Corroboration, in any case, is a relative matter calling for judgment on the part of an observer, and even the most highly regarded generalizations are always subject to revisions based on new evidence or more effective theoretical analyses. Strict confirmation by crucial experiment is largely an illusion.¹⁵ The essential point, however, is that experimental and statistical designs can be used to evaluate sets of interconnected hypotheses in such a way that their relative confirmability can be sufficiently established for most practical purposes. This, in principle at least, is as true in the social sciences as in the physical sciences.

Sociology in its various branches employs all of the previously mentioned forms of explanation. Some of its problems are quite similar to those of the predictive sciences. Other problems involve postdiction, that is, the systematic explanation of historical materials. Again, much of sociology is primarily concerned with matters of management and social control. All of these problems, in our view, are legitimate topics for scientific inquiry. For this reason the attempt to force sociological inquiry into any single mode of explanation is a serious error in strategy. At the same time, there are certain recurrent defects in sociological arguments, regardless of their mode of explanation, that merit special attention.

Perhaps the most common defect in sociological explanations is the attempt to solve problems by fiat rather than by corroboration of empirical generalizations. This defect is due chiefly to our failure to make a sharp distinction between 1) definitional statements that assert our inten-

¹² Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," *Philosophy of Science*, 15 (1948), 135-175. Also C. G. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958, Vol. II.

¹³ Assume that in large urban industrial American cities delinquency rates vary inversely with distance from city center. X is a large urban industrial American city. Census tracts a, b, c, . . . n, located in X, are listed in the order of their relative distances from the center of X. Now, the single assumption that "delinquency varies inversely with distance," when combined with the observed conditions (X is a large urban industrial American city and tracts a, b, etc., are arranged in the order of their distance from the center of X), can be used to predict the relative magnitudes of delinquency rates in the tracts specified. This is a simple illustration of explanation in sociology.

¹⁴ See especially Ernest Nagel, "The Logic of Historical Analysis," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, *op. cit.*; Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in H. Feigl and M. Scriven, *op. cit.*; and G. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2.

¹⁵ Pierre Duhem, *Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.

tion to use a designated term in a specified way and 2) empirical generalizations that claim a verifiable relationship among independently defined sets of events. Because of the resulting confusion, definitions are often used in lieu of empirical generalizations, thereby producing circular arguments instead of testable claims that can be employed in prediction, postdiction, or control of the phenomena in question.

For example, observed uniformities in human behavior are sometimes accredited to the impact of culture. The implication is that culture functions as some kind of independent social force that has a predictable influence on conduct. However, culture, by conventional definition, is comprised of certain behavior patterns that are uniformly observed among the members of a society and are transmitted from one generation to another. Presumably, then, only those patterns that are fairly characteristic of a society's members will fall within the meaning of the term. Thus, in our use of the culture concept we are inclined to accept the observation of behavioral uniformity as an explanation for such uniformity. That persons will behave as they are observed to behave is hardly an effective premise for explanatory argument.¹⁶

Many other allegedly explanatory concepts, such as socialization, organization, community, and role, to mention a few, often suffer from the same kind of circularity.¹⁷ As ordinarily employed, they merely provide abbreviated expressions for rather lengthy and cumbersome descriptions of observed behavioral tendencies. They usually say very little about the conditions that accompany or the mechanisms that mediate the observed tendencies. Such descriptions and definitions are necessary in the process of inquiry, of course, but they are no substitute for the formulation and test of empirical generalizations. When no testable assumptions are made, the definitions obviously take for granted precisely those tendencies that are to be explained.

Another major defect in many sociological explanations is the practice of introducing theoretical terms or concepts in a piecemeal fashion and one at a time without any indication of the role they are to play in systematic argument. Assessment of the explanatory potential of any given concept requires, first of all, that the phenomenon to be explained must be clearly indicated. In this sense all

inquiry begins with a volitional statement on the part of the researcher, a statement that describes the research objective and establishes the criteria for estimating the success of the inquiry when it is finished. Secondly, it is necessary to specify the manner in which the given concept is connected with others in the process of explanation. In the procedures of logical inference concepts never stand alone. They are always linked with other terms in the statement of law-like assumptions which provide a basis for the derivation of explanatory arguments. Consequently the final test of any given concept or definition is whether or not it can be used profitably in the formulation of verifiable generalizations having explanatory power. In general, that definition is best which most effectively serves the purposes of prediction, postdiction, or control.

This means that alternative definitions of concepts cannot be adequately judged by their relative agreement with previous language usage, by the richness of their descriptive content, by their reliability or by the degree to which they have been operationalized. Dictionaries of sociological terms and historical analyses of concepts give a little evidence regarding the merits of different definitions. Likewise, descriptive studies aimed at defining and operationalizing terms such as small groups, interaction processes, social status, and ecological segregation, for example, are of limited utility unless these terms, however defined, are linked with others in explanatory systems. In the absence of a clearly formulated problem and a related explanatory system that employs procedures of inference or deduction, it is very difficult to make any realistic evaluation of the relative merits of alternative definitions of concepts.

For sociology to advance beyond descriptive generalities into the realms of effective prediction and control, it may be necessary to revise our research strategy so as to make definition and observation an integral part of the business of formulating explanatory systems and theories. Preoccupation with observation and definition has produced masses of descriptive findings, but relatively little progress has been made toward the integration of these findings under general laws or theories. Furthermore, our efforts at integration have been largely based on vague and otherwise defective concepts, such as those already mentioned, rather than on verifiable empirical generalizations. It is one thing to observe uniformity in human behavior, to identify conformity and deviance, and to assume that these patterns must be explainable in terms of social processes or other forces; but it is quite another matter to incorporate the concept of process, for example, in an explanatory system that makes prediction of conformity and deviance possible. Further investigation is needed 1) to define the process independently of the behaviors to be explained, 2) to formulate the principles or laws that govern the process, and 3) to recognize the conditions under

¹⁶ There are, of course, a number of promising efforts to define culture independently of the behavior patterns to be explained. See especially T. Parsons and E. A. Shils, ed., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951; Leslie White, *The Science of Culture*, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Young, 1949.

¹⁷ An excellent attempt to avoid circularity is found in N. Gross, W. S. Mason, and A. W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958. See also the materials on socialization in D. C. McClelland, A. L. Baldwin, U. Bronfenbrenner, and F. L. Strodbeck, *Talent and Society*, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958.

which these principles and laws may be expected to hold true. When these tasks have been accomplished, the concept of process will be connected with empirical assumptions that have testable consequences. It will then be possible, given the observed conditions and the theoretical assumptions, to make explanatory assertions that can be corroborated or denied by relevant evidence.

III. LIMITATIONS OF THE MECHANISTIC CONCEPTION OF THEORY

The narrow empiricist-positivist thesis tends to inhibit needed innovation in contemporary sociology by presenting a faulty picture of scientific procedure. We begin, it says, with the observation of data. Then we classify the data into meaningful categories. Finally, we measure the empirical relations among these categories. Thus, the content of sociology is a variety of descriptive facts and a series of generalizations that connect the facts in a systematic matter. In this view, even the most comprehensive theories can be nothing more than abbreviated and perhaps elegant formulations of empirical regularities among observed variables.

Theory construction, according to the above view, is a mechanical operation involving a minimum of supposition and judgment on the part of the researcher. The main requirements are, first, an orderly arrangement of precisely defined variables within a given domain of inquiry and, second, availability of skills and techniques for observing empirical interrelations among the defined variables. Consequently "define your terms and measure their correlation" is the generic formula for hypothesis formation. For example, take any two variables from the sociologist's vocabulary, assume that their correlation approximates zero, and the result may be regarded as a testable hypothesis. Now, should the observed correlation prove to be high and reliable, this information can be used with a *ceteris paribus* clause for the purpose of prediction. Some of our studies are apparently founded on this model, and it must be admitted that their voluminous findings are sometimes significant; but it also seems fair to suppose that the value assigned to this strategy will vary according to the researcher's faith in serendipity!

More complex or comprehensive hypotheses are ordinarily constructed through the use of a larger number of variables. Regardless of the number of variables, however, purely mechanical methods can be used to identify all of their possible combinations. As a consequence, the system of hypotheses within any given domain of knowledge can be presented schematically by means of a double-entry table in which each variable of that domain is cross-tabulated against every other variable. When the appropriate correlations have been observed, the cells of the table may then reveal the direction and degree of relationship between any given pair of variables.

In the mechanistic view, the tasks that remain for further research are largely those of confirming the observed correlations and reducing the complexity of the table. Correlations are usually tested by repeated independent observations. Complexity may be minimized by the application of factor analysis or other statistical devices for locating families or clusters of variables that can be regrouped under more general concepts or subsumed under fewer generalizations. The objective of theory, in any case, is the construction of a minimum set of generalizations that makes possible the prediction of a maximum number of observed cell values.

The above mechanistic model for theory formation no doubt has a number of appealing features, including especially its simplicity, comprehensiveness, deterministic strategy, and inherent logical structure. Moreover, it seems to be entirely consistent with the empiricist-positivist contention that all theoretical concepts should have observable referents and that all theoretical propositions or postulates should be capable of verification with reference to observed variables. More specifically, the terms "concept" and "variable" are largely interchangeable within this framework, and postulates and hypotheses are merely extrapolations of observed relations among variables.

It is our view, however, that the mechanistic model fails to give an adequate portrayal of the process of theory construction because it 1) confuses theory, or postulational argument, with classification and it 2) underestimates the role of logical assumptions in the formulation of theoretical concepts.

Consider first the practical limitations of classification. Classification systems identify and sometimes provide a nomenclature for all possible combinations among a given set of variables. Their content, based on the calculus of classes or relations, is essentially descriptive; any predictions are achieved by extrapolations of observed data on the assumption that history tends to repeat itself or to go where it is heading. Such systems make no law-like assumptions concerning the relative frequencies of the various combinations or the conditions under which these combinations may be expected to occur. In sum, classification systems, unless they are supplemented by postulated empirical relations among the variables involved, are not subject to logical reformulation, and they are consequently of limited utility in predictive or explanatory argument.¹⁸

Many theories of contemporary sociology are little more than elaborate classification systems. Thus, Dodd's TILP, Parsons' theory of action, and the functionalist doctrine, for example, may provide formulas for the systematic description of any conceivable social event, but they do not enable the researcher to reason from given premises and

¹⁸ Carl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation," *op. cit.*, and G. Bergmann, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3.

observations to a set of predictive or explanatory assertions about social events. To illustrate, functionalism provides a cross-tabulation of essential needs and social structures or practices that presumably fulfill these needs, in this manner implying that needs can be identified independently of practices and can be used to explain variations in practice. The method of most functionalists, however, has been to work backward from observed uniformities in social practice to a set of hypothesized universal needs. Now, if needs are viewed as being highly uniform and general, they cannot very well be used to explain variations in practice. The current solution to this dilemma is to regard practices as being either functional or dysfunctional, a solution that clearly negates the initial assumption that the function of social practices is to fulfill certain essential needs.¹⁹

Although classification systems are necessary for the orderly collection of data, it is advantageous in empirical science to reserve the term theory for sets of law-like assumptions from which can be derived assertions that have predictive or explanatory capacity. Theories, in other words, must have both logical and empirical significance. Their logical significance is found in the inferential or deductive implications of the postulates that connect concepts and/or variables in a systematic manner. Their empirical significance can be investigated only after the terms of the theory have been related by rule to the data of observation and experience. Theories enable the researcher to formulate an idealized account of data not yet observed as well as those already reported. When this hypothetical account has a relatively high degree of correspondence with relevant observations, the theory can be used successfully for pragmatic purposes. Thus, a minimum requirement for any argument to be construed as an empirical theory is that it must present a set of postulates from which at least one verifiable assumption can be derived by means of probabilistic inference or logical deduction. In this connection, our complaint about many sociological theories is not that they are empirically inadequate but that their logical structure is often so vague and indefinite that their implications cannot be reliably ascertained.²⁰

¹⁹ For critical reviews of functionalism see Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December 1959), 757-772; Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., *op. cit.*; Ernest Nagel, *Logic Without Metaphysics*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1956, Ch. 10.

²⁰ For some sociological theories that appear to have sound logical structure see Herbert Simon, *Models of Man*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957; George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961; James A. Davis, "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation," *Sociometry*, 22 (December 1959), 280-296; R. Cloward and L. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1960. Some problems involved in the reconstruction of theory are nicely illustrated in Hans L. Zetterberg, *On Theory and Verification in Sociology*, New York: Tressler Press, 1954. Zetter-

Consider now the contention that the meanings of theoretical concepts are restricted to observed data. Inadequacy of this view can be illustrated with reference to even the simplest theories of physical science. For example, Kepler, after carefully observing the planet Mars, concluded that planetary orbits follow an elliptical curve around the sun, and Newton, noting some perturbations from the elliptical pattern, introduced the principles of gravitation and acceleration in order to improve the adequacy of astronomical predictions. The question at issue is whether conceptions of ellipses, gravitation, acceleration, etc., are inherent in the data of observation. Despite Mill's strong plea in the affirmative,²¹ a more reasonable contention is that such concepts are hypothetical constructions rather than abbreviations for empirical events and that their meanings cannot be fully expressed by reference to events that have already been observed.

Kepler and Newton were neither content with their descriptive observations nor with predictions based on the notion that history repeats itself. Instead, they formulated law-like assumptions from which the occurrence of previously unobserved events could be fairly accurately anticipated. In their search for general laws of motion they employed hypothetical concepts that are by no means restricted to observed data. Thus, the elliptical concept assigns to Mars positions that had never been observed and which are, according to more recent formulations, considerably in error. In addition, the equations of classical mechanics use concepts that for theoretical purposes are assigned values which could never have been observed in any concrete case. As a result, the equations of planetary motion make many untested assertions about events not yet observed. Moreover, their theoretical significance, that is, their utility in explanation and prediction, lies precisely in the fact that their claims transcend any series of previous observations.

In general, the more highly developed the theory the less dependent are its concepts upon the data of observa-

berg reconstructs some of Durkheim's theory, using a completely deterministic system in which every proposition is, in effect, an all-or-none statement involving only two variables at a time, and assuming that the relations in the theory are transitive and symmetrical. He correctly begins with a set of primitive terms and constructs the concepts of the theory by means of nominal definitions. However, in listing the postulates and theorems, Zetterberg makes some obvious errors in each instance. For example, if the number of concepts is N , and assuming a deterministic structure such as that employed by Zetterberg, the number of postulates is $N - 1$ and the number of postulates and theorems combined is $N(N - 1)/2$. By constructing a double-entry table in which every concept of the theory is cross-tabulated against every other concept, one can locate precisely the errors of commission and omission involved in Zetterberg's reconstruction of Durkheim.

²¹ John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, New York: Harper, 1848. For an opposing view that is more consistent with our position see William Whewell, *History of Inductive Sciences*, London, 1837. The views of Mill and Whewell are reviewed by Philipp Frank, *op. cit.*, Ch. 13.

tion. Basic concepts of modern physics often refer to hypothetical and unobservable entities or relations that are connected to observation data only by means of operational definitions or correspondence rules included within the theories. Instead of being defined in terms of observed variables, theoretical concepts are frequently introduced into the vocabulary of a theory through sets of postulates that define the concepts by implication. Postulates, then, provide rules for linking the concepts in expressions that are legitimate within the theory. These expressions can be transformed and rearranged without loss of validity so long as the rules of logical consistency and implication are strictly followed. Some of the expressions may have no clear empirical significance and the theory may be connected with the facts of observation in only a few strategic places.

Even in the social sciences it is usually impossible to give a theory a complete empirical interpretation. What we do is examine the implications of the theory and test some of them as best we can. This is the case, for example, when we compute delinquency rates in census tracts located at varying distances from a designated point of origin in order to test the assertion that "delinquency rates vary inversely with distance from city center." Although the generalization claims that there are delinquency gradients in all directions from the city center, our tests are usually based on rates in local zones that correspond only roughly to arbitrary points along some of the hypothetical gradients. It is clear that the logical claims of the inverse distance hypothesis can be only crudely tested on an empirical basis.

The logical independence of 1) postulates or hypotheses and 2) relevant empirical observations makes assertions about unobserved events possible and allows for the empirical corroboration or disconfirmation of our theories. Theoretical concepts and postulates, then, do not have inherent empirical meanings. Their meanings are assigned by semantical operations that are at least partly independent of the logical structure or the syntactical rules of the theory.²²

IV. CONCLUSION

Scientific achievement does not depend so much upon the verification of independent hypotheses as it does upon the systematic arrangement of concepts and findings under abstract theories that are rich in their logical implications as well as accurate in their empirical claims. Em-

²² Difficulties involved in relating theoretical concepts to observed data are discussed in C. G. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," *op. cit.* Herbert Feigl is less cautious in rejecting the notion that theoretical concepts must have immediately observable referents. See H. Feigl and M. Scriven, *op. cit.*, Ch. 1. Also note Rudolf Carnap's contribution in Ch. 2 of the same volume.


pirical laws may provide the foundation for organized knowledge, but the structure of modern science grows out of concepts and theories that connect the laws in a systematic manner.

So long as the mechanical model for theory construction was accepted without question, there was little room for disagreement over matters other than the selection of problem areas, definitions of terms, and methods of data collection. But the empiricist-positivist tradition is being challenged from several directions, notably by philosophers of science who investigate the logical foundations of inquiry and by research specialists whose current methods of discovery and justification are radical departures from the mechanistic model. The result is a good deal of controversy over methods of concept formation, sources and functions of postulates, techniques for assigning meanings to abstract propositions, and devices for testing and certifying arguments that have empirical implications.

Problems of theory construction and confirmation can frequently be traced to conflicting perceptions of the normative standards of science. Disagreements over research procedures are strikingly similar to arguments that prevail in matters of social policy and community management in that they are not likely to be resolved by any specific program of experimentation but by the cumulative experiences of large numbers of research workers and perhaps of some persons who, although they may not be directly involved in scientific activities, exert control over research opportunities and facilities. There is, in fact, no essential reason for assuming that the strategies of conflict resolution in the fields of research are very different from those in other lines of human endeavor.

Definition of a problem is always the first step toward its solution. Before we can make realistic evaluations of the judgments and assumptions that direct our research inquiries, it is necessary that we recognize the role played by social norms and conventions in the process of inquiry. It seems plausible that in the examination and evaluation of their own normative standards, scientists may learn something more about the operation of such standards in other phases of social life. No other topic is more germane to the central concerns of sociology today.²³

²³ Our interest is in helping to clarify essential distinctions among descriptive statements, explanatory arguments, and prescriptive expressions. To say that prescriptive expressions play a role in scientific inquiry is not to deny these distinctions. For contrary opinions, however, see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944, Appendices 1 and 2; J. F. Cuber and R. A. Harper, *Problems of American Society: Values in Conflict*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1948; Herbert Blumer, "What is Wrong with Social Theory?" *American Sociological Review*, 19 (February 1954), 3-10; A. W. Gouldner, "The Concept of a Value-Free Science as Ideology," Presidential Address before the Society for the Study of Social Problems, St. Louis, 1961.



PROGRAMMATIC THEORY AND THE CRITICS OF TALCOTT PARSONS*

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Although scientists disagree on many issues, some of them are, in principle, *unproblematic*, e.g., whether or not a law follows from a certain theory, because such issues are decided by established empirical or logical procedures. Disagreements about the future of a science are not so straightforwardly resolved, e.g., the present prospects of a certain conceptual scheme or the long-range prospects of certain kinds of enquiry. However, even here an important difference may be noted. Whereas the present prospects of a theory may be considered to be a matter of *strategy*, more far-reaching commitments may concern such general facts that they are unlikely to be settled in the foreseeable future. For instance, the controversy of reductionism versus emergence, while it is clearly a factual issue, is not decidable on the basis of present-day evidence, nor can either position be exclusively established on methodological grounds.

These problematic disagreements are crucial enough in mature sciences. But in an immature science such as sociology, with limited theoretical achievements, it becomes imperative to examine alternative strategies and programs in order to clearly distinguish limited commitments from general *theses*. In such analyses, however, it is important that one guard against erecting standards of evaluation which may militate against creative activities. That is to say, criteria of judgment should be appropriate to the scientific enterprise in general without laying down special requirements or advising particular developments which are of questionable validity. In this regard, the methodological task of assessing the soundness of criteria employed in critiques of limited programmatic statements is therapeutic, even if not necessarily directive.

The purpose of this paper is to examine two critiques of Parsonian theory which are concerned with its current status and present prospects, namely, Ellsworth Faris' review of *The Social System*¹ and Clarence Schrag's discussion of the "theory of action."² These particular critiques

were selected because they exhibit very different criteria of evaluations concerning the development of theory. In order to focus clearly on methodological issues, however, the adequacy of their interpretations of Parsons' views is not called into question. Rather the analysis is confined to the evaluation of the standards they employ in arriving at their conclusions. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this enquiry will have general significance for other critiques of programmatic theory viewed in this limited sense.

FARIS ON THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Although dogmatism is best avoided in interpretive reformulation of an individual's position, the interpretation advanced in this paper of Faris' argument is that it apparently rests upon the following assumptions:

1. The body of fruitful concepts in any science is a result of cumulative and cooperative efforts of many men over long periods of time.
2. General acceptance of a scientific discipline is due to men who write about it well. Poor writing, the result of unclear thinking, greatly harms the development of a science.
3. Some concepts, even in an immature science, are "proved" to be indispensable, e.g., 'group' in sociology.
4. In the construction of a new conceptual scheme the body of accumulated terms should be drawn upon without discarding or redefining familiar ones, e.g., in sociology the term 'attitude' should not be discarded and 'role' should not be redefined.
5. The psychological origin of a classification scheme determines its scientific worth, e.g., "... the ivory tower is not the place to classify birds or flowers or fishes or social systems."³

On these grounds and in each of the above respects Faris judges that Parsons had not followed the advisable course. His argument is *persuasive*, for the historical continuity of science is quite evident. It would also be *plausible* if this growth were solely by external addition. But, as Cohen and Nagel have put it, "Science... is sometimes deliberately changed according to some idea or

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association, April, 1961. The writer would like to express his indebtedness to Robert J. Ackermann and Donald A. Wells for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

¹ Ellsworth Faris, Review of *The Social System* by Talcott Parsons, *American Sociological Review*, XVII (February, 1953), pp. 103-106.

² Clarence Schrag, "Comments on the General Theory of Action," *Alpha Kappa Delta*, XXIX (Winter, 1959), pp. 46-52.

³ Faris, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

pattern to which previous existence is not relevant."⁴ Although it may appear parallel to the physical paradox of the man who pulls himself up by his own bootstraps, the systematic correction of rules of procedure and standards of evaluation is, in science, an acceptable procedure which is consistent with the establishment of scientific knowledge.

Therefore, the argument which Faris produces is *unsound* because it is an instance of the genetic fallacy, i.e., the supposition that the logical analysis of a science may be replaced by an account of its historical development. One need not be committed, however, to the converse form of this fallacy, i.e., imposing a logical order on a temporal one, in an attempt to correct this error. Both forms may be avoided by invoking the distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of justification.' Consideration of this distinction even allows that if one grant the truth of Faris' statements he need not, on that account, accept them as adequate standards by which to evaluate the validity of a theory. Further, in the following use of this important distinction by Hans Reichenbach, it is evident from his contrast between relativity and quantum programs that those who produce arguments which rely upon examples to support programmatic assertions are quite vulnerable:

The philosopher of science is not much interested in the thought processes which lead to scientific discoveries; he looks for a logical analysis of the completed theory, including the relationships establishing its validity. That is, he is not interested in the context of discovery, but in the context of justification . . .

Seen from this viewpoint it appears amazing to what extent the logical analysis of relativity coincides with the original interpretation by its author, as far as it can be constructed from the scanty remarks in Einstein's publications. In contradistinction to some developments in quantum theory, the logical schema of the theory of relativity corresponds surprisingly with the program which controlled its discovery.⁵

Rather than present a formal characterization of this distinction the relevance of these considerations for the present enquiry may now be informally summarized as follows: A scientist, in proposing a new theory, is not required by scientific standards to detail his thought processes and feelings nor to specify the social influences which may have entered into the discovery or the development of his theory (though he may often do so). But, in presenting his ideas to others, deductive (and perhaps inductive) justification is expected. However, a rigorous justification may entail a rational reconstruction of the theory, perhaps accomplished by someone other than the theorist. Never-

theless, the processes involved in the discovery or development of the theory may remain quite obscure without affecting its validity; nor would they be relevant, in this regard, even if known.

The import of the above discussion should be clear. Since Faris' critique is not concerned with the context of justification, except for a remark or two about imprecise definitions, his criteria do not relate significantly to the consistency of Parsons' system, to the truth of its results, or to the validity of its inferences. Even so, if he were consistent in his charge that the book is unintelligible, he would have a strong case. For surely a minimum requirement of a theory is that it be understandable. But he also maintains that "the lack of clarity resulting from the unfamiliar combinations in this book are not insuperable obstacles to its understanding if the reader will devote sufficient time to the task. The book can be its own Rosetta Stone and it is an interesting game to try to ferret out meanings by comparing passages till the puzzle is solved."⁶

Hence, if Parsons' meaning is finally clear, then exactly what is Faris' objection? Or perhaps one might better inquire, is he then barred from evaluating the validity of Parsons' work, because of its lack of clarity? Apparently not. In fact, it would appear to be inconsistent to offer an explication of a book which one considered to be "highly obscure and unintelligible."

In regard to Faris' views, the following questions are raised in order to indicate the inappropriateness of the criteria he employs: (1) Should one always adhere to traditional concepts in developing theories, or, if not, under what conditions should he depart from traditional frameworks? (2) Will his efforts be abortive if, in the main, he doesn't hold to traditional usage? (3) Are there standards of exposition which can be shown to always deter scientific development and others which "make a contribution"? (4) Should the scientist always try to write with the same degree of clarity and explicitness at every stage of his theorizing? (5) What types of experience are productive of fruitful theories—"grass roots research" or "ivory tower speculation"? Whatever the answers to these questions may turn out to be, it is clear that any theory, whether arrived at by an "acceptable" path or not, is evaluated on the basis of criteria regarding its coherence and confirmation. Thus, an examination of the logical structure of Parsons' framework and its connections with observable phenomena would seem to be more appropriate than historical considerations.

SCHRAG ON THE GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION

Consideration of this possibility shifts the attention of this paper to Schrag's analysis of Parsons' more general "theory," since it is based upon studies in the methodology

⁴ Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1934, p. 390.

⁵ Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity," *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, (ed. by) Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954, pp. 197-198.

⁶ Faris, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

of theory construction within logical empiricism. It should be noted at the outset, however, that Parsons' discourse is primarily discursive; that Schrag is not explicating a formally stated theoretical system. Nevertheless, with explicit emphasis upon syntactical and semantical requirements for the axiomatization of a theory Schrag summarizes "... the essential characteristics of scientific theory as (1) a specific vocabulary of primitive and derived terms, (2) a set of postulates arranged in a deductive system that is productive of further generalizations, and (3) a dictionary that relates certain terms of the theory to observable phenomena."⁷ On these grounds and in each respect, Parsons' "theory" is judged to be inadequate.

The primitive terms are not fully specified. Derived terms are introduced without clear reference to the primitives. Postulates and theorems are not precisely formulated or adequately distinguished from definitional propositions. Operational definitions and empirical interpretations are infrequently encountered. Thus the framework is deficient in formal determinacy, empirical testability and explanatory effectiveness.⁸

While these judgments appear to be quite damaging, since the criteria for axiomatization are acceptable, the conclusions are too strong to be supported by the evidence advanced. If the qualifying phrase "in this formal explication" had been added, the argument would be more plausible. As it stands, however, the most that could be validly concluded is that given the particular primitive terms and postulates chosen the logical structure and empirical connections are deficient. Perhaps it could even be claimed that any other attempt, employing the same primitives and postulates, would exhibit similar inadequacies in the theory. But when one considers the constructed nature of axiomatic systems, it can be easily seen that alternative formulations, with different primitive terms, are possible, perhaps yielding support for a different evaluation of the theory. In fact, Herbert Feigl indicated in the following that the clarification of the *meaning* of scientific language may entail alternative formal analyses:

It seems fairly obvious that the clarification of the logic of science is greatly aided by the construction of syntactical and semantical metalanguages... [but] Carnap has pointed out repeatedly that exact rational reconstruction or explication by means of artificial languages (or language-schemata) may be achieved in various alternative manners, and that the respective advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives have to be weighed against one another. Perhaps only the total set of useful alternative reconstructions can give us anything like a satisfactory analysis of meaning.⁹

⁷ Schrag, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Herbert Feigl, "Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy of Science and Logical Empiricism," *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. I, (Ed. by) Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, pp. 5-6.

Thus, without denying the utility of a formally constructed theory or its desirability as a scientific goal, it seems to the writer that Schrag's further argument that since Parsons' "theory" is not a formally deductive system it is therefore "... a system of nomenclature or taxonomy rather than a fully articulated theory"¹⁰ is unwarranted because it does not consider the full range of possibilities.

Since Parsons has repeatedly emphasized that he is developing a conceptual scheme, but that it does not represent a mature theoretical system, perhaps even the *applicability* of standards of evaluation adopted from the formal requirements of interpreted calculus systems may be seriously questioned. At least it would appear that such formal criteria do not offer sufficient grounds for determining when such a task should be attempted. Gustav Bergmann, in the context of discussing the development of psychological theory, states the problem most perspicuously as a matter of judgment.

As a science develops, a store of laws and concepts accumulates together with an awareness of some connections, deductive among the laws, definitional among the concepts. At a certain point in the development it pays to arrange this material into a theory...

Obviously axiomatization or even formalization is not the magic key... Whether or not psychology has yet reached this stage is a matter of judgment... In my opinion some psychologists have been much too self-conscious about axiomatization. Occasionally the "rigor" is carried to the extreme of wanting to supplant ordinary English by the apparatus of formal logic. The fruitfulness of this advice at the present stage of knowledge still remains to be demonstrated... On the other hand, some of the most successful theorists in psychology, those making the most elaborate deductions now extant and inventing the most significant concepts now available, are among the least self-conscious.¹¹

The import of this position, for present purposes, is not the time element itself, i.e., when to attempt an axiomatization of a theory, but rather that the development of a theory is a different process from its reconstruction. Therefore, even if Schrag has correctly identified difficulties in Parsons' work, such observations do not substantiate the following advice to proceed with formalization:

It [the Parsonian framework] offers great promise of future development. For this reason it is hoped that a determined effort will be made toward formalization of the system. Some areas in which the rigor and precision of the framework could relatively easily be improved have been indicated above.¹²

In regard to Schrag's views, the following questions are raised in order to indicate the complexity of the issues at

¹⁰ Schrag, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹¹ Gustav Bergmann, *Philosophy of Science*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1958, pp. 35-36.

¹² Schrag, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

stake and the inadequacy of a formal analysis to answer some of them: (1) Does knowledge of the formal structure of successful scientific theories give sufficient grounds for the evaluation of the fruitfulness of a given framework at each and every stage of its development? (2) Is this formal knowledge an adequate basis for deciding, without further rules and empirical analyses, when axiomatization is warranted and appropriate? Could it ever be misleading and disadvantageous to theory construction? (3) If a theorist is very conscious of such formal requirements, is he assured of producing fruitful theories, or, if he is not, can one be assured that he will not produce such theories? (4) If an attempted axiomatization fails is one justified in rejecting a theoretical formulation as inadequate? Could there not be an alternative axiomatization possible? (5) Even if an axiomatization is successful, does it explicate adequately the meaning of a theory?

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that the two critiques may now be seen to be two aspects of the same enterprise, i.e., the erection of methodological canons for the direction of theoretical development. Faris on the one hand advises attention to predecessors, Schrag on the other hand advocates formal rigor. While both emphases are certainly noteworthy, conclusions are drawn which are unwarranted for the suggested limitations or directions of theoretical activities.

Perhaps it should be emphasized, in conclusion, that the purpose of this paper has not been to defend any particular theoretical approach. Quite the contrary. Although the two cases examined are limited, the intent has been to exhibit general considerations applicable to any critique of programmatic theory which suggests delimitation to particular kinds of activities or advises the employment of special techniques. The following plea by Rudolf Carnap is then considered appropriate for the devotee of any strategy or program, if such devotion leads one to argue for the restriction of linguistic choices:

The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic forms in any branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required. To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms instead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use, is worse than futile; it is positively harmful because it may obstruct scientific progress... Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression which seems useful to them; the work in the field will sooner or later lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function. *Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.*¹³

¹³ Rudolf Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity: A Study of Semantics and Modal Logic*, 2nd ed. enlarged, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Phoenix Books), 1958, p. 221.

THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN PERSONALITY*

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CLOSED AND OPEN SYSTEM MODELS

No one today seriously discounts the impact of culture and society in the formation of personality, nor denies the fruitfulness of a search for differences in modal personality types among cultures and subcultures. There is dispute over the extent and nature of such differences and the character of the causal principles linking personality to society, but the relationship itself has become axiomatic.

Nevertheless, in the study of sociocultural determinants of personality an implicit assumption is frequently made which precludes what might be the sociologist's major contribution to the field. Personality is treated as a psychogenically closed system which society activates but does not structure. Social environment selects from among the predetermined ways in which the organism can function and determines the rate of function. Because societies activate the several dimensions of personality at varying rates, there is considerable range in modal configurations. The differences are nevertheless reducible to varying combinations of rates for the same set of personality variables.

The closed system model resembles a piece of machinery which is designed to perform a set of tasks and each of which tasks is controlled by specific intake devices. At any given moment an organism can be usefully regarded as such a closed system, capable only of a repertoire of responses and capable of being activated only by stimuli which are suited to its activators. But such sociological and anthropological study of personality assumes that the character of the closed system is independent of culture, especially with respect to the dimensions of functioning, if not of intake. From the early studies in the ecology of mental disorders to recent research in social psychiatry the problem has been defined as discovering a relationship between a sociological variable and a preestablished psychiatric type. Culture-personality studies and research into personality characteristics of social classes and age and sex subcultures have likewise sought a fit between a group dimension and a pre-validated personality classification. The social science investigator typically employs an instrument which has been designed to measure or classify personalities according to some established psycho-

logical school of thought.¹ The sociologist, who cannot claim competency in deciding which psychological theories of personality are correct, must nevertheless choose, running the risk that his own work will be rendered irrelevant when the tides of thought in psychology change.

The point of our discussion can best be grasped by considering the accomplishment and limitation of the modal character approach to culture-personality study. Investigations which compare the frequency of given personality configurations in various societies depend upon the assumption that their types or variables are equally valid in each of the societies. Implicitly denied from the start is the assumption that what societies do is to *organize* the complex of behavior in distinctive ways. The personalities of the Zuni looked amazingly uniform to Ruth Benedict, leading her to describe a modal type which probably reflected her experience with variation inside of American culture.² The apparent uniformity may have been an artifact of the failure of Zuni society to differentiate personality into the types and along the dimensions most common in Western society. At the same time, Zuni society may have differentiated personality along other dimensions to which the western observer was not sensitized by his own culture. The modal personality approach then diverts attention from the possibility that culture may create the dimensions along which personality varies, because of its preoccupation with finding one or more dimensions on which societies can be compared.

An instructive example is supplied by Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion of the Philistine, Bohemian, and Creative types of social character.³ While these types are offered as products of a universal socialization process, the authors comment, "An unavoidable consequence of the now prevalent social organization is that the immense majority of individuals is forced either into Philistinism or Bohemianism." The competition among many rival

¹ Daniel Miller phrases the approach in typical fashion when he suggests that the problem in cross-cultural investigation is to know which of the systems to select from a standard psychological text on personality. Cf. "Personality and Social Interaction," in *Studying Personality Cross-Culturally*, Bert Kaplan, ed., Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1961, p. 271.

² *Patterns of Culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

³ Edmund H. Volkart, ed., *Social Behavior and Personality*, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951, p. 185.

* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, St. Louis, 1961.

complexes for the individual's conformity violates the requirements of personal integrity. The individual then either adheres to one scheme hypocritically, or continually passes from one unsatisfactory system to another. Thus Thomas and Znaniecki describe a type of society in which people tend to be differentiated along a Philistine-Bohemian dimension, leaving unstated the implication that in a differently ordered society character structures might be organized along other dimensions. In light of their speculation it might be more fruitful to compare societies in which the Bohemian-Philistine differentiation is marked with those in which there is little consistent differentiation of this kind, than to compare societies according to the degree of Bohemianism and Philistinism.

Confusion about the proper dependence upon ultimately psychological and neuropsychological concepts sometimes derives from failure to distinguish between the study of elementary psychological processes and the organization of personality. The study of personality is distinctive chiefly because its object is the *organization* of behavior in individuals. One could hardly defend a conception of infinite malleability which denies a set of common human psychological processes. But organization at the *person* level—the characteristic orientations of persons toward social objects—cannot be inferred directly from a knowledge of elementary neural properties, and consequently need not be uniform from society to society.

Our object in this paper is to suggest that sociologists can make a useful contribution by testing the assumption which is normally implicit. In order to test the assumption, investigators must formulate hypotheses which proceed from the opposite axiom, and from some conception of the social processes of personality organization. If such hypotheses are consistently refuted, the model of the psychogenetically closed system may be followed with greater assurance. If the hypotheses are confirmed, an extensive area of investigation will have been opened up. Beginning with an examination of the criteria by which we identify dimensions and type of personality we shall suggest clues to probable relationships between social structure and the nature of personality organization.

THE BASES FOR PERSONALITY CLASSIFICATION

Treatment of personality always takes its reference from behavior, observed or hypothesized. But personality study looks at behavior in a distinctive fashion which supplies the criteria for useful classifications of personality. First, a personality variable or type refers to some observable *consistency* in behavior. An unrepeatable type of action is not in itself made the basis for establishing a dimension or type of personality, and the dimensions we make the basis of personality theory reflect areas in which considerable behavioral consistency has been noted on the part of large segments of the population.

Second, categories of personality incorporate interrelatednesses of behavior. A *constellation* of behaviors is implied, such that if you observe one or two elements of the constellation in an individual you also expect to find the others. A concept such as the authoritarian personality, for example, would be totally without justification except for the assumption that its various elements are predictable from one another.⁴

A third criterion for a category in personality analysis is that it must *differentiate* people.

Fourth, we apply a criterion of *significance* to the behavior whose consistency, interrelatednesses, and interpersonal differentiation are the bases for a personality category. From time to time the Sunday supplements amuse us by noting that we probably are consistent about which sock we put on first, and that this is related to how we get into an automobile, etc. But we do not make such regularities a basis for personality study because the behavior is not of a kind which has much effect on the behavior of other people. We study authoritarianism, introversion, ego-strength, because they denote configurations of behavior which make a difference in interaction with others. Significant behavior is behavior which others notice, consider important, and characteristically respond to by an adjustment in their own behavior.

Fifth, we distinguish between personality and mere conformity to the norms of position. For example, on a ritual occasion two military officers may display equally commanding behavior, but we discount this as concealing true personality differences, and look to their behavior when they are off their ceremonial guard. This criterion is merely an extension of the requirement that personality categories differentiate persons rather than positions, but is worthy of special stress because it leads us to some crucial observations about the social sources of personality organization.

There is a rather simple moral from this list of criteria for categories of personality. The study of personality should be in large part the study of sources and processes of organization of behavior. If we are to search for the dynamics which account for the peculiar structure which personality exhibits, we must look for them in the sources of consistency, interrelatedness of behavior, differentiation among individuals, and significance. If we can locate important causes of consistency in behavior, we shall have discovered some of the dynamic factors accounting for the organization of personality. The same observation applies to the other criteria.

SOCIAL SOURCES OF PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION

Cultural choice and personality. The fifth criterion for personality classification is a good starting point for

⁴ Theodore Adorno, et al, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper, 1950, esp. pp. 224-241.

specifying probable relationships. When we discounted ceremonial behavior as an indicator of personality, saying that one soldier was a decisive and commanding sort of person and the other a weak person underneath the surface, we assumed that there were other occasions when such differences would be reflected in behavior. But a society in which there is considerable achieved status may be necessary for such a notion of personality as the *real*, the *underlying tendency*, to emerge. When human behavior is dominated by ascribed status the opportunities for a person to behave in non-ritual circumstances in a way which can be recognized as weakness or strength will be fewer and less important than in American society. The opportunity to undergo systematic learning of a pattern of behavior inconsistent with the ascribed role will be less well developed and a conception of the "real self" or "real personality" hidden behind public behavior is likely to be less salient than it is in our theorizing about personality.

The foregoing observation suggests one determinant of personality organization. Personality dimensions form about areas of choice, where the culture is permissive, either by explicit value, or by default. Stated another way, personality dimensions are related to the lines of slack in the social order. Where the culture is entirely compelling and behavior is defined precisely, the possibility for personality dimensions to arise is severely limited.

An example which may be germane to this principle is the importance of the domination-submission theme in the study of personality in the United States and some western societies. Almost every system for the study of personality devised in the United States has emphasized variations of some sort about the idea of domination among its major variables. In Winch's study of mate selection the "needs" which conform to the complementarity hypothesis are generally those related to a dimension of assertiveness and receptiveness.⁵ But the variable of ascendance, dominance, assertiveness, etc. may be less crucial in personality differentiation in other societies. There may be less consistency along this dimension outside of ritual situations, fewer other variables may cluster about it, it may be a less significant variable in interaction. The preoccupation with questions of relative dominance in the family and in marital relations in the American family is likewise exceptional, and arises from the undefined character of dominance. The result is that instead of the individual moving smoothly according to cultural dictate between situations demanding dominance and situations demanding submission in his relations with different categories of people, he learns a predominantly dominant or predominantly submissive orientation which becomes his characteristic stance to such a degree that it impinges

⁵ Robert Winch, *Mate Selection*, New York: Harper, 1958.

upon his ability to perform in situations where the proper dominance is unambiguously defined.⁶

Organization of socializing experiences. The first criterion of personality organization which we suggested was consistency of behavior. The most general social and cultural sources of consistency are of two kinds. One of these is exposure to a consistent sequence of socializing experiences, but experiences which are consistently different from those of some other persons. The second is the presence of cultural values which sensitize self and other disproportionately to some facets of behavior. These sources supply further clues to the social correlates of personality differentiation.

Socialization takes place through a succession of many experiences in many relationships. If the result is some personal consistency the explanation must be that threads of consistency run through these experiences. The parent-child relationship may be as important as we suppose it is chiefly because of its continuity in the life of the individual. The social organization helps to determine which aspects of the socializing relationship between parent and child will be most consistent and which least consistent, which elements of the relationship will be grouped, and what the major alternative groupings will be. The socializing agent's relationship to the socializee is shaped in large part by what responsibilities he performs outside of the socializing relationship and the timing of these activities. Consistencies, then, will be determined by the alternative patterns of extra-socializing tasks and by the alternative systems of combining the tasks with the socialization relationship.

The axes of consistency will also vary according to the concentration or dispersion of socializing responsibility, and the generality or specialization in socializing relationships. Many anthropologists have called attention to the difference in modal personality produced in the extended family relationship as compared with the nuclear system.⁷ But a systematic exploration of alternate modes of adaptation by the child to each of the two kinds of family relationship might supply the framework for discovering different axes of personality organization. A family system such as the Trobriand Islanders, which makes a sharp differentiation between the indulgent father and the stern uncle, might be examined from this standpoint.

Major values and self-conception. The idea of a self-conception which brings some order into personality on

⁶ Margaret Mead has noted a difference of this sort in Samoa. "Such a man does not develop a fixed response to others which is definitely either dominance or submission, leadership or discipleship, authoritarian insistence or meek compliance, exhibitionism or refusal to play any public part; the multiplicity and contrast between his roles prevent any commitment to one personality type from developing." *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1937, p. 296.

⁷ Cf. Dorothea Leighton and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Children of the People*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947, pp. 42-49.

the basis of self-other relationships is commonplace for sociologists. Sociologists are also aware that it is not only an internal strain for consistency which is at work.⁸ Only if the individual's behavior is sufficiently orderly that others can make minimal predictions will the responses of the others be sufficiently predictable to the individual that he can exercise some control over his social environment. Because ability to control others depends upon being sufficiently predictable oneself, the individual early acquires some consistent organized orientations toward social objects. The orderliness in behavior of which we speak is designated by values. The interactive pressures toward consistency are therefore organized according to the major types of value differentiation made in a society. In accordance with the predominant modal personality approach we have excellent studies which attempt to relate dominant value to modal personality, but few to the internal differentiation of personality types in response to specific values.⁹

The range of deviant personality types is relevant here. Margaret Mead in a pioneering study called attention to the absence of the type of homosexuality with which we are acquainted in American society in some of the primitive groups she studied.¹⁰ One notable feature of the berdache appears to be the absence of polarization into active and passive roles among homosexuals to which we are accustomed. Here may be an example of a type of personality differentiation which arises out of one way of valuing and

Many of our classifications of personality convey imtreating homosexuality which does not arise out of another. plicitly a favorable or unfavorable valuation. This frequently embarrassing observation may not stem from tendencies in the investigator to import his values into the investigation, but from the impact of values upon the formation of consistencies and clusters of behavior during socialization. If socialization serves chiefly to make the individual predictable, if the major basis of predictability is personal consistency, and if the most important axes of predictability are major values, there is good reason to expect useful personality dimensions to be value-loaded.

Major divisions of labor. In discussing the two previous facets of social structure we have emphasized the sources of consistency in behavior. We can also uncover clues from the sources of tendencies for behavior to form constellations. The major divisions of labor supply an important basis for linkages of behavior. While the more refined

specialties of labor may not appear until adolescence or adulthood, there are some pervasive divisions for which children are prepared early in life. Each such division separates a large variety of behavior into a few sets, creating the expectation with supporting social pressure that an individual will pattern his behavior principally from one of the clusters rather than randomly from all.

A review of correlational studies would undoubtedly reveal that a large proportion of the dimensions and types employed in personality analysis are associated with the sex of the individual. As long as the personality variables are assumed to derive their structure from the psychogenic properties of the organism, interpretation of such relationships is the conventional problem of understanding correlations between two independent variables. But alternatively, such correlations may reveal that social definitions of sex roles have helped to account for the organization of behavior into the clusters which are being employed in the personality analysis. The more pervasive the division of labor between the sexes the wider the range of behaviors which will be associated and the more strongly they will be associated with the sex division.

Thorsten Veblen, in *The Instinct for Workmanship*, develops the theory that the dominant type of occupation in any era created a general outlook on life and approach to the natural and social world.¹¹ These dominant occupations also probably establish a fundamental set of dimensions which serve as a reference in the organization of personality. Again, the discovery that many personality characteristics bear some correlation with occupation may be partly the discovery of one of the sources of the prevailing differentiations of personality.

Instrumental consequences of roles. The other important way in which social organization leads to the grouping of behaviors is through attaching instrumental consequences to the performance of various roles. A highly speculative account of how such linking of characteristics might take place can be suggested, not for its intrinsic merit but as an example of the kinds of possibilities worth exploring. The introversion-extroversion dimension is one which rests empirically upon the clustering of several kinds of tendencies. The extravert, for example, prefers sociability to solitude, prefers action to reflection, and is insensitive to minor slights and unfavorable reactions. While Jungian theory interrelates these and other elements on the basis of the psychogenic character of the organism, there is room for alternate hypotheses. The last few centuries in western civilization have been a period in which traditional social controls have been weakened so that the individual who is moderately insensitive to disapproval from others is a "favored" type. Because of the reward structure, such an individual develops self-confidence and is prepared to

⁸ Prescott Lecky, *Self-Consistency: A Theory of Personality*, New York: Island Press, 1951.

⁹ Among the interesting exceptions to this observation is Raymond A. Bauer's discussion of two alternate forms of adaptation in "The Psychology of the Soviet Middle Elite: Two Case Histories," in *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, eds., Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, New York: Knopf, 1953, pp. 633-650.

¹⁰ *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1934, pp. 290-309.

¹¹ *The Instinct for Workmanship*, New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918.

act readily and is comfortable in the presence of others. In a society in which sensitivity to others was an asset rather than a liability, the same correlations might be lacking. If American society is swinging, as Reisman proposes, from inner direction to other direction, the interrelationship among these elements should be altered in the process. The change would mean not principally that introversion or extraversion would become less common, but that the clustering of forms of behavior necessary to justify the use of such a concept would be altered.

The object of offering these five points has been to demonstrate that a plausible case can be made for the position that the dimensions along which personality is organized may vary with the society. The five general relationships can serve as a starting point for hypotheses which can be used to test whether the usual axiom or the alternative view best fits actual situations.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOGENIC AND PSYCHOGENIC

Separation between levels. At this point account must be taken of criticisms lodged against excessive social determinism by such writers as Inkeles¹² and Wrong.¹³ Wrong's criticisms apply largely to an overly simplistic conception of socialization as a process whereby individuals are fitted into a cultural mold, rather than learning to take account of society and culture systematically in their behavior. Inkeles asserts that some psychological theory must be assumed in the sociological study of personality. Both of these criticisms indicate that sociological studies of personality cannot merely ignore the psychogenic system of organization in personality. The presence of two levels of organization means that behavior will never be wholly predictable on the basis of socio-cultural personality variables. We have approached the problem of this paper by searching for the sources of consistency, interrelatedness, and significance in behavior; clearly there are such sources in the nature of the organism as well as in social structure. The knotty problem is therefore the nature of the relationship between the levels of organization, and what account must be taken of each in study of the other.

One approach to this problem is to show that processes at the two levels correspond so as to produce the same set of dimensions. Talcott Parsons' examination of the differentiation of roles during socialization is a monumental effort to establish such a relationship.¹⁴ While such careful logic cannot easily be discounted, the solution seems

too easy. It seems improbable that the dynamics of one level should correspond to those at another unless one is merely an extension of the other.

Earlier Ernest Burgess dealt with this problem imaginatively in his distinction between the psychogenically determined "personality type" and the sociogenically determined "social type."¹⁵ While the two levels do not correspond, the effective adoption of a social type depends upon its supplying avenues for expression of the personality type. Thus the psychogenic is causally prior and less flexible, and while it does not determine directly the sociogenic level it sets limits within which sociogenic processes must operate. The problem in Burgess' analysis, however, is that the psychogenic includes too much and the sociogenic too little. The sociogenic is limited to the adoption of culturally identified roles, and the psychogenic includes such obviously social learning as a characteristic reaction to authority and supervision. With a more comprehensive conception of the sociogenic, the Burgess hypothesis remains a highly promising approach to this problem.

Whatever the functioning relationship between the levels of personality, the recognition of intrinsically social dimensions of organization suggests the principle that homogeneity at one level may correspond to heterogeneity at the other. This principle can be most simply illustrated through the generalizing effect of culture. The "favored personality" concept indicates that attitudes which have one dynamic in the individual who serves as model may be emulated by others who lack these dynamics.¹⁶ The parent who has a set of attitudes because of her own unique psychological dynamics may transmit them to her children without the original dynamics. Thus the system of orientations toward social objects may be homogenous but the psychogenic constellations heterogeneous.

An interesting correspondence can be found between Horney's neurotic with his need to be loved and to control and Reisman's other-directed man.¹⁷ The two sets of symptomatic descriptions are largely variations on a common theme. But Horney calls her type neurotic and discovers its dynamics in a reaction to the sense of isolation and powerlessness which arises in consequence of competitiveness. Reisman's type, on the other hand, is assertedly functional to our society and arises through the normal processes of social transmission. Is it possible that the two views accurately reflect the situation as it prevailed two decades apart. Perhaps the pattern developed first as Horney specifies, and then became subject to the generalizing impact of culture so that it now may be acquired with

¹² "Personality and Social Structure," in *Sociology Today*, eds., Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 249-276.

¹³ "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (April, 1961), pp. 183-193.

¹⁴ Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955, pp. 35-257.

¹⁵ "Discussion," in Clifford R. Shaw, *The Jackroller*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 184-197.

¹⁶ Cf. Don Martindale and Elio Monachesi, *Elements of Sociology* New York: Harper, 1951, pp. 312-378.

¹⁷ Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1937; David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

or without the dynamics described by Horney. If this were so we could reasonably observe that the socially homogeneous other-directed personality type need not correspond to any strictly psychological type. By this reasoning the discovery of small correlations, such as those in the monumental authoritarian personality studies, need not supply any clue to the determination of a socially important personality type.

Perhaps such observations can help to shed light on the debate over Durkheim's famous assertion that a social fact must always be explained by a social fact.¹⁸ Durkheim's social facts correspond to the organization of behavior at the sociogenic level. The organization of behavior at this level bears a stable relationship only to causes at that level. Relationships to other levels are fortuitous and impermanent, though non-the-less important while they exist. Theory always posits some kind of closed system in which relationships are necessary rather than fortuitous, and theory can consequently be developed only within such a level.¹⁹ But theory and the prediction of actual behavior are different matters. Theory at any one level gives only a partial accounting for behavior. Hence, Durkheim himself was forced to work with broad correlations, on the assumption that relationships at other levels were random with respect to the social level he was studying.

CONCLUSION

The import of the foregoing is not to detract from the many exciting achievements of the standard approaches to personality study. It is rather to call attention to the dilemma of the sociologist who depends for his theory upon the psychologist or the anthropologist, and to urge the fruitfulness of another line of inquiry which has received scant attention.

¹⁸ Emile Durkheim, *Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique*, Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1927, pp. 120-137.

¹⁹ Cf. Ralph H. Turner, "The Quest for Universals in Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, 18 (December, 1953), pp. 604-611.

It is of interest to note that sociology made a vigorous start in the area of culture-personality study in the work of Durkheim, Thomas, and others, but in recent years has largely abdicated to anthropologists and psychologists. Psychologists who had devised the instruments and the concepts for the study of personality, and anthropologists who had refined the techniques for summarizing cultures, monopolized the skills required in the conventional approaches to culture and personality. The sociologist, whose forte lay in elaborating the processes and differentiation within a society could enter the area only by abandoning his interest in social structure for the anthropologist's interest in culture, or by simplifying his conceptions of social structure in order to note rough associations between the psychologists' categories and broad subcultures. But the problem of how a given society supplies unique patterns of organization for personality, corresponding to the differentiating processes at work within that society, calls for precisely the skills of the analysis of social structure which are nearest to the sociologist's stock in trade.

It is time to rejuvenate the sociological field of study once called "social differentiation." But in rejuvenating it we should add an important dimension. Differentiation is not only the elaboration of social structure; it may also be the source of a major level of organization in individual personality. Because societies differentiate their populations differently, they may also provide different organizing frameworks for personality. The study of more profound relationships between social structure and personality organization may well be the most promising next step after culture-personality. And such traditional sociological types as Thomas' types of immigrants,²⁰ Park's marginal man,²¹ and Strong's social types of Negroes,²² need not be disparaged because they have not been translated into a set of psychological variables.

²⁰ Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Chicago: Society for Social Research, 1925, pp. 81 ff.

²¹ Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33 (May, 1928), pp. 881-893.

²² Samuel M. Strong, "Social Types in a Minority Group: Formulation of a Method," *American Journal of Sociology*, 48 (March, 1943), pp. 563-573.

SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF RACIAL PREJUDICE: SOME LIGHT ON THE CONTROVERSY FROM RECENT RESEARCHES IN BRITAIN*

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The object of this paper is to review some of the studies that have been made in Britain since the second world war in the field of racial relations and concerning, in particular, the origins of ethnic prejudice. Certain general conclusions may be drawn from these studies which are relevant to the problem that has been debated ever since the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*¹ in America, with regard to the relative significance of personality factors and social variables in the genesis of prejudice. Compared with the United States the volume of research on racial relations conducted in Britain has been small. Nevertheless, studies in this field constitute a considerable proportion of all published sociological investigations undertaken in Britain in recent years, particularly when it is remembered that the non-white population of Britain, which is mainly of immigrant origin, still constitutes only a half of one per cent of the total population.

Professor Herbert Blumer, among others, has drawn attention to the inadequacy of theories of racial prejudice which place all the emphasis upon personality variables and treat prejudice as a quasi-pathological phenomenon.² Both before and since the publication of the researches undertaken by Adorno and his colleagues there has been a tendency to concentrate upon psychological aspects and to explain racial prejudice in terms of subjective dispositions induced by threatening or frustrating experiences, especially in childhood. Implicitly or explicitly such theories have a marked psychoanalytic orientation and tend to trace adult attitudes and behavior to unresolved conflicts in parent child relations. Now the pendulum appears to be swinging away from psychological studies once

again, this time towards sociological variables and an emphasis upon 'situational' determinants. In this connection Professor Blumer has argued that race prejudice is a "sense of group position" not reducible to specific feelings such as hostility or antipathy.³ It transcends the attitudes of individuals which need not always be unfavorable. This "sense of group position," he submits, is an historical product set by conditions of initial contact and variable in intensity subsequently.

These propositions raise certain questions concerning the inter-relation between psychological and sociological factors in the determination of attitudes and behavior. Firstly, granted that any concrete reality situation is an "historical product" what are the most important determinants of "group position" in Blumer's sense and how does a "sense of group position" emerge? Secondly, what is the relation between customary norms of behavior with regard to ethnic group relations in a given culture or sub-cultural situation and the personalities of the individuals participating in that situation? Studies of racial relations in Britain, although not specifically designed with these questions in mind, nevertheless, throw some light on them.

RACIAL RELATIONS IN BRITAIN

The pioneer study of racial relations in Britain was that undertaken by Dr. K. L. Little.⁴ In addition to conducting a field study in one of the oldest mixed racial communities in Britain he reviewed the historical data relating to Negroes in Britain. He drew attention to the comparative small size of the non white population and the consequent lack of personal experience of the inter-action with Negroes on the part of whites. He emphasized the part played by slavery and the slave trade together with the campaigns against these institutions in creating a climate of opinion. The defenders of the slave trade deliberately spread ideas concerning the racial inferiority of Negroes, while the philanthropists who were opposed cul-

* This is a revised version of a public lecture given at the University of California, Berkeley, February 23, 1961. In preparing it for publication the paper has benefitted from discussion and criticism in graduate seminars at the Department of Sociology, University of Washington and the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles.

¹ T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper, 1950.

² Herbert Blumer, "Research on Racial Relations in the United States of America," *International Social Science Bulletin*, X (1958), pp. 403-447.

³ Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 1 (Spring, 1958), pp. 3-7.

⁴ K. L. Little, *Negroes in Britain*, London: Kegan Paul, 1948.

tivated benevolently paternalistic attitudes. Further historical evidence presented by Dr. M. P. Banton confirms the continuing existence of the dual outlook.⁵ This was reinforced by the doctrines of racial superiority spread by the social darwinists and the imperialist notion of the "white man's burden" held by colonial administrators and missionaries. Banton goes on to suggest that the Negro in Britain represents what he calls the "archetypal stranger." This contrasts with the situation in the United States, particularly in the south, where Negroes have lived in considerable numbers alongside whites for three hundred years. As a consequence clear cut role-expectations have emerged within the framework of a fairly rigid social system, in which both Negro and white "know their place." There is considerable resistance on the part of the dominant white population in the south to any change in the *status quo*. In Britain, on the contrary, there has been little opportunity for clear cut norms of behavior to emerge. The recent influx of immigrants from Asia, Africa and the West Indies, who are highly visible because of their difference in skin color, present a problem to the white population who do not know exactly how they ought to behave towards them. The colored immigrant is equally at a loss because his position in the social structure is so ambiguous. The "sense of group position" to which Blumer refers is almost entirely lacking in this situation because there has not been the long period of habituation in which unambiguous codes of behavior could emerge.

The only localities in Britain where there has been time for a more established pattern of racial relations to emerge are dockland settlements in the major ports such as Cardiff and Liverpool where there have been colored communities since the end of the nineteenth century, with several generations of British born colored people living in them. When these communities are studied some light is thrown on the process by which a relatively fluid situation such as I have just described, can set into a distinctive "sense of group position" as understood by Blumer. My own investigations in Liverpool began with an examination of the historical factors which appeared to have contributed to the existence of widespread color prejudice.⁶ In particular, I showed how derogatory stereotypes concerning Negroes had been created and spread, reinforced by the publicity given to the well-meaning but misleading reports of welfare organizations. I also traced the increase in the numbers of Negroes in Liverpool and the association between discrimination and racial conflict, on the one hand, and fluctuations in unemployment in the city, on the other. On the basis of this evidence I suggested that manifestations of ethnic prejudice were a function of

three main factors acting in conjunction. These factors were, firstly, "The existence within the community of two or more groups easily distinguishable from each other by a characteristic such as skin color, which is highly visible; secondly, the creation of false stereotyped ideas concerning the members of the out-group which impede the establishment of good personal relations between members of the two groups and thirdly, the existence of feelings of insecurity among the in-group."⁷ On the basis of more detailed field studies of West Indian Negroes in Liverpool and in the light of comparative evidence from American researches on racial relations, I elaborated this proposition and put forward three inter-connected hypotheses concerning ethnic group relations.⁸ The first was the familiar "in-group/out-group hypothesis" to the effect that,

"Where two or more groups of different ethnic composition come into contact and communication with each other there will be a tendency for the members of the same ethnic group to identify closely with one another to the exclusion of the members of other ethnic groups to whom derogatory characteristics and hostile intentions may be attributed."

The second hypothesis was concerned with the way in which stereotypes, once they have come into being, are reinforced and perpetuated. I called this the "frames of reference/barriers to communication" hypothesis to the effect that:

"The attitude of a person towards members of out-groups is the product of a frame of reference largely derived from the individual's own group membership. Subjective and institutionalized barriers to communication re-inforce stereotyped beliefs and hostile attitudes which are only effectively modified when the individual has the shared support of his own group."

The third proposition, which I called the "Status/Security hypothesis," was concerned with the circumstances in which unfavorable attitudes may be translated into positively hostile acts, discrimination and the like.

"An individual's sense of status and security is derived from his group membership and through receiving expressions of love, approval and esteem from those with whom he identifies. Insecure group membership or fear losing status is a source of anxiety and may result in the direction of hostility upon out-group members and others."

It is significant that, in an independent study conducted more recently, Dr. A. T. Carey found the same three factors operating.⁹ Carey endeavored to explain the prejudice and discrimination experienced by colored Colonial

⁵ M. P. Banton, *White and Coloured*, London: Cape, 1959.

⁶ A. H. Richmond, "Economic Insecurity and Stereotypes as Factors in Colour Prejudice," *The Sociological Review*, (XLII), 1950.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸ A. H. Richmond, *Colour Prejudice in Britain*, London: Routledge, 1954.

⁹ A. T. Carey, *Colonial Students in London*, London: Secker & Warburg, 1956.

students in London, England, when they tried to rent rooms. He found that 90 per cent of the people renting accommodation to students explicitly refused to accommodate Negroes. However, Carey regarded the insecurity exhibited by those discriminating as originating from class consciousness. In this respect he follows Little who tries to explain color prejudice in Britain as a manifestation of the class structure.¹⁰ I do not accept this view. Little postulates a "color-class consciousness" to explain why some people in Britain avoid association with Negroes. This explanation might appear to be applicable to the relations of status conscious middle class or upwardly mobile individuals with Negro industrial workers or seamen. But it fails to explain the prejudices of lower class persons against Negroes or the rejection experienced by Negro students and professional people. It is not a question of Negroes in Britain having a low rank in the system of social stratification, but of their having no recognized place in British society at all.

The term "status" in my own formulation of the "status/security" hypothesis has a wider connotation than mere class ranking and corresponds more closely with what Blumer has called a "sense of group position." As he points out, a sense of group position cannot be equated with class status as ordinarily conceived for it refers not merely to vertical positioning but to many other lines of position independently of the vertical dimension.¹¹ It is a sense of where the two racial groups belong, i.e. their place in society. It is precisely because, outside of the few older colored communities in the dockland areas, the Negro has not a set "place," in British society that there is antipathy towards him. He is a stranger and an "outsider" and as such is the real or assumed bearer of different cultural and moral values, of which skin color is an outward and visible symbol. As such he is an actual or potential threat to the white majority.

RACIAL ATTITUDES

Further light has been thrown on the attitudes of people in Britain towards colored immigrants by more recent researches. An unpublished national sample survey, conducted in 1951, found that the population fell into three groups of roughly equal size according to degree of prejudice.¹² It claimed that the most extreme group would object to mixing socially with or even working in the same place as a colored person, and would probably approve of this attitude in others. In 1956 Dr. M. P. Banton conducted a sample survey of the results of which have

been published.¹³ In a number of important points of detail results of the more recent survey confirm those of the earlier enquiry. However, Banton considers that the proportion of the population that can be regarded as severely prejudiced is much less than one third. Both investigations found that only about half the population had "come across" a colored person although the proportion was higher in the urban centers in which new immigrants had settled. The most frequent situation of contact was at work, but only 11 per cent of the population could claim to have known a colored immigrant personally. Nine per cent claimed to have had favorable personal experiences and 1 per cent unfavorable personal experiences of colored people. It is clear, therefore, that attitudes in Britain are not the product of direct interaction. Thirty-seven per cent were prepared to give an unequivocal "yes" to the question, "Provided there is plenty of work about, do you think that colored colonials should be allowed to come to this country?" and a further 35 per cent gave affirmative answers qualified by some reference to housing shortage, or by a repetition of the proviso in question. Only about half the respondents considered that landlords and hotels who refused to take colored people were wrong. When asked whether they personally would mind working with a colored person two-thirds said they would have no objection, but when asked what they thought other people would feel about it less than a quarter considered that "most people would not mind!" Only 6 per cent admitted that they themselves would dislike the idea of working with a colored person but 16 per cent attributed such objections to "most other people." Twenty-eight per cent did not express an opinion about their own feelings in the matter or said that it would depend on circumstances; but 65 per cent expressed no opinion about others or said it would depend on circumstances.¹⁴

Although two-thirds of the respondents were unable to give a firm opinion regarding the attitudes of others there appears, nevertheless, to be a tendency for people in Britain to attribute greater unwillingness to work with or to invite home a colored person to other people, than to themselves. It is difficult to determine the correct interpretation to be placed on this. In the earlier enquiry this tendency was regarded as evidence of prejudice in the respondent. It was assumed that this was consciously suppressed or unconsciously repressed and instead attributed to or projected on to others. It was, therefore, included in the calculation of an "index of antipathy." Banton does not accept this interpretation. He suggests that "when people say that others of their acquaintance would dislike working with a colored man, or having one as a neighbor or visitor, they are saying that this would be contrary to

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* p. 232 and in *Race and Society*, Paris: UNESCO, 1952.

¹¹ *Op. cit.* (P.S.R., 1958) p. 5.

¹² "Colonial Affairs and the Public," mimeographed and privately circulated, London: June 1951.

¹³ *Op. cit.* Appendix 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 201. I am indebted to Dr. Banton for allowing me to see some unpublished analyses and tabulations of this material.

the group's norms of conduct, not that each of these people, individually is unfavorably disposed."¹⁵ He argues that the maintenance of social distance is customary and not necessarily actuated by prejudice. The distinction between attitudes as attributes of individuals and customary norms of behavior as attributes of groups corresponds closely to Blumer's distinction between "personality" and "situational" determination of racial prejudice and discrimination.¹⁶ However, it still leaves unanswered the question of the relation between the two. How do people form their notions of what is expected by the members of the group to which they belong or by which they try to model their behavior?

In a relatively small, homogeneous type of group or society in which people are in close contact and communication with each other it is likely that they have a clearly formulated and realistic knowledge of what the norms of behavior in that group are. In a study of family relationships in Britain and their connection with class and other social differences, for example, Dr. Elizabeth Bott found that in a long established working class area of London, in which families have lived together for several generations, people had little difficulty in stating what was the "done thing" in various circumstances.¹⁷ Other studies of similar neighborhoods have shown that there is in them a fairly high consensus of opinion on the norms of behavior in family and other matters. But in interviews with people not living in such close knit communities, Bott found respondents had much greater difficulty in formulating their views of what other people think and do. In modern urban society friends and acquaintances usually form a scattered network of relationships. In such situations Bott found that people's views of what constituted the social norms or the "done thing" in their own social circle reflected the subjective needs of the respondents and did not have the close correspondence with objective reality that exists in a relatively closed community. People who needed to feel that their own behavior was 'normal' attributed their own standards to others, but some people tended to compensate for feelings of inferiority or guilt by attributing to others behavior which placed themselves in a more favorable light. She therefore suggested that, "individuals internalize other people's standards from their experiences with them, but that is not the end of the matter. If the internalized standards agree with one another, which tends to happen in organized groups and close-knit networks, there is little necessity for selection and internal re-arrangement. If many different and contradictory norms are internalized, individuals select some rather than others and construct their own version in accordance with their per-

sonal needs. They may attribute this personal version, or certain aspects of it, to other people besides themselves, and they have a wide range of reference groups or categories from which to choose the recipients of their norms. In brief, projection and displacement play so important a part as internalization in the acquisition of norms."¹⁸

It is the element of projection in the perception of norms, (that is in the attribution of attitudes, values, beliefs and behavior to others), which Banton discounts when he denies that a tendency to consider others unfavorably disposed is in itself a sign of antipathy in the respondent. Almost all socialization and adjustment processes involve elements of both internalization (or introjection as psycho-analytically inclined writers prefer to call it) and externalization or projection. The latter occurs in people who use repression as a defense against anxiety and consequently lack insight into their own motives and behavior. Experimental evidence supports the psycho-analytic view that repression and projection tend to take place when people feel guilty about possessing a given trait.¹⁹ They become self-righteous and indignant at others for attitudes they do not care to admit in themselves. It is notable that in Britain, particularly in the past decade, statesmen, clergy and the mass media of communication have almost unanimously condemned manifestations of racial prejudice and in so doing have created a situation in which individuals inclined to be antipathetic towards colored people will almost certainly have some guilty feelings about it. In the light of this it is highly significant that Banton should have noted that questions concerning the respondent's own and other people's attitudes towards working with colored person, "elicited many comments protesting the subject's own belief in equality and anger over the suspiciousness of others." Earlier in his book he noted "how little insight some people have into their own attitudes on this topic, as may be illustrated by the number of times people who express opinions indicative of antipathy towards colored people finishing by affirming that they themselves are not prejudiced."²⁰ The presumption here in favor of repression and projection is very strong. In dismissing it Banton almost certainly under-estimates the real extent and degree of color prejudice in Britain.

The evidence from a Gallup poll conducted in 1958 certainly indicates rather more antipathy than Banton found in his survey.²¹ However, the Gallup poll was taken almost immediately after publicity had been given to racial disturbances in one midland city in England and may not be

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 113.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.* (I.S.S.B., 1958) p. 436.

¹⁷ Elizabeth Bott, *Family and Social Network*, London: Tavistock, 1957.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 214.

¹⁹ R. R. Sears, "Experimental Studies of Projection," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 7 (1936), pp. 151-163, and W. Rabinowitz, "Social Perceptions of Authoritarians and Non-Authoritarians," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53 (1956), pp. 384-6.

²⁰ *Op. cit.* p. 75.

²¹ Quoted in Ruth Glass, *The Newcomers*, London: Allen Unwin, 1960.

representative of public opinion at other times. One thing which did emerge clearly from the survey was the ambivalence and inconsistency of so many of the respondents, many of whose responses appeared to be uncertain or contradictory. It was found that 22.5 per cent of the sample gave replies too inconsistent to be used for scaling purposes. Of the remainder 12.6 per cent (9.8 per cent of the total sample) fell into an "extremely prejudiced" category and 19.4 per cent (15.1 per cent of the total sample) were rated as 'very tolerant.' More particularly, 71 per cent of the total sample disapproved of mixed marriages, 16 per cent did not know and 13 per cent approved. When asked "Would you move if colored people came to live in great numbers in your district?" 26 per cent said definitely "Yes," 35 per cent said they might do so and 39 per cent said "No." Only 7 per cent said they would object if there were colored children in the same class as their children in school, while 12 per cent said they did not know and 81 per cent that they had no objection.

It is evident that a mild degree of antipathy towards Negroes is widespread in Britain although the more extreme degrees of prejudice are characteristic only of a minority. Relationships between Negroes and whites in Britain are not highly structured and institutionalized as they are in America, especially in the southern states, although as colored communities are established in British cities there are signs that a "sense of group position" may be emerging out of the initially amorphous situation. Evidence from studies of English national character and of anti-semitism suggest that antipathy is not confined to Negroes but extends to other out-group members in a similar fashion. In a study of a working class area of London Dr. J. H. Robb found 83 per cent of his sample expressed some anti-semitism, but only 9 per cent was of an extreme variety.²² Mr. Geoffrey Gorer in a sample survey of English informants found shyness and a fear of strangers to be a typical English personality trait.²³

It follows that from a cultural or sociological point of view ambivalent attitudes and a mild degree of prejudice towards strangers in general and Negroes in particular is a "normal" rather than a pathological phenomenon in Britain and probably in other countries too. Antipathy towards out-groups may, in certain circumstances, perform positively integrative functions for individual personalities and for the social systems in which they participate. It bolsters up the individual's sense of security and self-esteem on the one hand and promotes in-group solidarity on the other. How can this view be reconciled with the findings of Professor T. W. Adorno and others concerning the pathological features of ethnocentrism? If

a mild degree of prejudice is a basic personality trait in a particular society it would appear that there are two possible types of deviants from this norm. There are those who have had exceptionally authoritarian socialization experiences in infancy, in adolescence and the formative years of adult life and there are those whose experiences have been exceptionally non-authoritarian. These atypical experiences will be associated with greater degrees of prejudice and tolerance respectively. It is significant that most of the psychological studies of ethnocentrism have tended to concentrate upon those subjects who have scored very high or very low on an attitude scale. This has been misleading. Instead of providing an answer to the question that is usually posed namely, "who becomes anti-Semitic or anti-Negro?" research of this kind provides us with an answer to a totally different question, namely, "What experiences in the life history of the individual predispose him to become a deviant, by expressing much greater or much less antipathy towards out-groups than is normal in his society?" The emphasis is upon the deviance and not upon the ethnocentrism.

CONCLUSIONS

The present article has been confined, deliberately, to an analysis of racial prejudice as an *attitudinal* phenomenon. A distinction between "prejudice" and "discrimination" is a familiar one and other factors not considered here would have to be taken into account if an explanation were being offered for overt discriminatory behavior. In particular I have shown elsewhere that in the British situation economic factors play an important part in determining whether certain kinds of overt discrimination and racial conflict will occur.²⁴ This does not mean that economic factors do not also influence the formation of attitudes but they are likely to be woven into the cultural fabric as a whole and manifest themselves as one of a number of influences generating a sense of status insecurity.

In the study of the origins of prejudice there is a constant interaction between subjective dispositions and cultural norms. The connecting links between the individual personality and the social system are to be found in the concepts of internalization and projection on the one hand and the institutionalization of norms and values in the social system, on the other. In this respect personalities and social systems are interdependent. The early formulations of the culture-personality theorists tended to imply that individual personalities were simply a mirror image of the culture and wholly formed by it. However, it is necessary to modify this encyclopaedic notion of culture and to recognize that in a complex urban society it is the detailed role-structure of the society and its numerous sub-

²² J. H. Robb, *Working Class Anti-Semite*, London: Tavistock, 1954.

²³ Geoffrey Gorer, *Exploring English Character*, London: Cresset, 1955.

²⁴ A. H. Richmond, *Applied Social Science and Public Policy Concerning Racial Relations in Britain*, *Race*, 1 (May, 1960).

systems that is responsible for molding the personalities of its members, leaving tremendous scope for a variety of individual experience and variation from basic personality types. Furthermore, the individual's perception of his own roles, and of the group's norms of conduct tends to be selective and in part a reflection of his subjective needs.

Any behavior, whether purely verbal or otherwise, which is common to the majority of the members of a society, (if that society is not in a state of social disorganization or *anomie*), must be in some degree internalized in the personalities of its members and institutionalized in the social system. This means that a socially approved response does not arouse inner conflicts or guilt feelings nor does it evoke negative sanctions of disapproval from those with whom the individual habitually associates. Such behavior may, however, conflict with the corresponding values of another culture or sub-culture, when contact occurs between them.

A further point that should be made in this context concerns the effects of social change. Learned (internalized) value-attitudes may be functionally integrative for personalities and for the social system at one point in time. But when rapid social changes take place such responses may become dysfunctional for the new system of social relationships which the individual finds himself participating in, at a later date. Pre-dispositions which have been established early in life are later found to be inappropriate and call forth negative sanctions of disapproval from others. It is then incumbent upon the individual to "un-learn" his responses and acquire new ones. But if the anti-pathetic attitudes which the individual has acquired earlier are fulfilling a crucial function in maintaining psychological security there will be reluctance to change. It is in this context that the findings of Adorno and others concerning the relation between rigidity, as a personality factor, and ethnocentrism are important.²⁵

²⁵ Further evidence using British subjects is contained in, R. Gordon, "An Investigation of Stereotyped Images" *British Journal of Psychology*, (Gen. Section) XXXIV (March, 1949).

THE LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR OF NEGROES AND WHITES

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In developing the principle of linguistic relativity Benjamin Whorf has contended that language shapes man's view of the world so thoroughly that "users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar sets of observations, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world."¹ While this position emphasizes the functions of language for the individual it underplays the significance of the social role of language.

Roger Brown has suggested a distinction between *language*, which is a formal system composed of a phonology, a morphology, and a grammar; and *thought* which he defines as a set of cognitive categories manifest in the discriminating use of names.² With respect to meaning (equated in some ways with "thought") Floyd Allport rejects the doctrine of linguistic relativism, asserting that "meanings . . . cannot be originally given by signs of objects. They are not 'mediated,' but are derived directly from dealing with the objects themselves."³ Allport is obviously stressing the development of the relationship between meanings and signs which occurs in the process of socialization. He goes on to observe that "much confusion has arisen because of the tendency to identify meaning in toto with language and to think that when we have covered the semantic aspect we have solved the problem."⁴ The process of learning to associate meaning with symbols takes place in a social setting. Given changes in the character of this setting there will be changes in the meanings attributed to symbols.

Applying this line of reasoning to the specific context of social relations it may be concluded that there is a direct relationship between the forms of social organization experienced by a child and the meaning which that child comes to attach to symbols used in communication concerning these relationships. In an article entitled "Language, Logic and Culture," Mills presents a similar view.

¹ Harry Hoijer, *Language in Culture*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.

² Roger Brown, *Words and Things*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958, p. 260.

³ Floyd Allport, *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1955, p. 573.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 573.

Emphasizing language as a process, he asserts that "newly sanctioned social habits force new meanings and changes in old meanings."⁵ He further contends that "language, socially built and maintained, embodies implicit exhortations and social evaluations. . . . A vocabulary is not merely a string of words; immanent within it are societal textures—institutional and political coordinates. Back of a vocabulary lie sets of collective action."⁶

A test of the relationships between meaning, patterns of social organization, and the formal organization of a symbol system is very difficult when the subjects studied do not share a common language. It is a simpler task when a common symbol system exists as is the case with American Negroes and American whites. Under these circumstances if one could show that different patterns of social organization are systematically associated with different meanings for mutually used terms, or if one could show that converging patterns of social organization are associated with convergences in the meanings of terms, a substantial step would have been taken in the development of a theory of language.

This paper reviews a pilot study undertaken to explore one approach to the identification of linguistic differences between Negroes and whites. The following rationale underlies our expectation of differences in the language behavior of Negroes and whites.

American communities are characterized by a high degree of residential and institutional segregation of the Negro population. Thus, the rates of interaction *within* racial groups are much higher than they are *between* racial groups. As a result of their position as a minority racial group, the vast majority of Negroes experience common status problems. These are manifest in their conceptions of self, in their relations with other Negroes, and in their relations with whites. The high rates of interaction among Negroes, combined with the status problems they experience produce certain norms common to Negroes within the Negro community. In addition to these normative differentials numerous studies have documented the existence of differences in the forms of family, political, economic, and religious organization as compared to the

⁵ C. Wright Mills, "Language, Logic, and Culture," *American Sociological Review*, 4 (October, 1939), p. 676.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 677.

white community. In such a setting it is to be expected that the social experiences through which words take on meanings for these Negroes will be differentiated from those experienced by whites. Words associated with these settings will have systematically different meanings for members of the two racial categories.

What is the nature of these differences in meanings? The following suggestions are based upon the analysis of a series of recorded interviews with Negro family members from a project designed for another purpose. The language behavior of these Negroes appeared to differ in three ways from that of whites of a comparable status level. First, words seemed to have a more *personalized meaning* for the Negroes. They were used to refer to self and self experiences. Second, they appeared to be used in an *evaluative, emotive fashion* rather than in a denotative fashion. Finally, the subjects tended to use words in a *less abstract, categorical manner* than do whites.

A word of caution might be added at this point. It is not contended that there will be no differences in the linguistic patterns within the Negro population. Differences would be expected to arise as a result of variations in class and regional background.⁷ In addition, some Negroes will not have been raised within the setting of the Negro community and would therefore not be expected to follow the linguistic patterns of that community.

THE STUDY

General Approach: There are several possible approaches to the study of racial linguistic patterns. For example, Roher and Edmonson examined differences in dialect among Negroes in New Orleans.⁸ In another study Johnson found that Negro respondents were particularly sensitive to certain words and phrases often used by whites.⁹ The emotional reactions to these resulted in communicative barriers between Negroes and whites.

In this study the approach was slightly different. It consisted of an analysis of differences in the use of words which are common to the vocabulary of both Negroes and whites. It seems likely that if Negroes and whites use the same words in communicating with one another and yet attach different meanings to these, effective communication across racial lines would be difficult and interaction strained, even in situations characterized by approval of interracial contacts.

⁷ Leonard Schatzman and Anselm Strauss, "Social Class and Modes of Communication," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (January, 1955), pp. 329-338.

⁸ J. H. Roher and M. Edmonson, *The Eighth Generation*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.

⁹ R. Johnson, "Negro Reactions to Minority Group Status," in Milton Barron (ed.), *American Minorities*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957.

Study Design: Fifteen white and fifteen male Negro respondents were interviewed. They were all students at the University of Washington and their ages ranged from 18 to 21 years. In all cases but one their fathers had completed at least some college and on this basis they were roughly classified as "middle class."

Data Collection: The data were collected by means of a questionnaire administered in a personal interview by a student interviewer. A list of ten words was presented with sufficient space following each word for the respondent to write a short paragraph defining that word. The following instructions were given:

On this and the next page we have listed several words. Following each word space is provided for a short paragraph. We would like you to define each word in your own way, telling us what it means to you. Work as rapidly as possible and try to indicate how you would use the word in your normal conversation.

At the end of the questionnaire, additional information was secured on the subject's age, residential history, father's occupation and father's educational attainment. The ten words selected for use are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS MAKING SELF REFERENCES IN THEIR DEFINITIONS OF TEN WORDS—BY RACE OF RESPONDENT

Word Defined	Race of Respondents	
	Negro (N = 15)	White (N = 15)
Home	9	9
Color	6	1
Minority	6	0
Father	7	1
Neighborhood	4	0
Scholarship	0	0
Job	8	1
Slum	0	0
Sex	1	0
Policeman	0	0

Data Analysis. Three categories of analysis were used in classifying the data. They included (1) self reference—no self reference in the definition of the term; (2) the level of generality characteristic of each definition; and (3) the degree of emotionality reflected in each definition.

If in his definition, the respondent made use of any personal pronouns such as I, my, or our, the definition was classified as "self reference." If, in any fashion, he indicated that the phenomenon being discussed was one of a class, his definition was classified as "high generality." Finally, if any emotion-denoting terms were used in the definition, it was classified as "high emotionality."

The selection of these categories was based in part on direct experience in communication with Negro family members. They are, however, closely related to three of four categories used by Schatzman and Strauss in their

analysis of modes of communication reflected in interview protocols from working and middle class respondents. One of their categories, "perspective or centering," which they define as the standpoint from which a description is made is similar to the one we have labeled "self reference." Our "level of generality" category closely resembles their "classification and classificatory relations." Finally, our "emotionality" category fits into their conception of "organizing frameworks and stylistic devices." The definition for each of the ten terms was coded dichotomously on each of these three dimensions. Word by word tabulations were then made.

THE FINDINGS

In general, the findings appear to bear out the hypothesis that differences in word usage between Negroes and whites do exist and that they may be identified in the fashion noted above. Table 1 presents the findings concerning the use of self reference in the definition of these words. It may be noted that in general, the Negro respondents made reference to self far more extensively than did the whites. This was particularly true of the words *father*, *minority*, *color*, *neighborhood*, and *job*. A majority of the respondents in both groups made reference to self in defining the word *home*.

Table 2 presents the findings on the use of emotion-denoting adjectives. Again, the words *color*, *minority*, *father*, *neighborhood*, and *job*, evoked different responses from Negroes than from whites with the Negroes reflecting a higher level of emotionality. The word *home* evoked more frequent emotionality from the white respondents, as did the word *sex*, although the differences here are small.

Table 2. NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS USING EMOTION-DENOTING ADJECTIVES IN THEIR DEFINITIONS OF TEN WORDS—BY RACE OF RESPONDENT

Word Defined	Race of Respondents	
	Negro (N = 15)	White (N = 15)
Home	8	11
Color	6	0
Minority	6	3
Father	7	3
Neighborhood	6	3
Scholarship	0	0
Job	4	2
Slum	2	1
Sex	1	3
Policeman	0	1

The patterns of response analyzed on the basis of level of generality are presented in Table 3. Here, except in the case of the words *color* and *minority*, the data do not bear out the hypothesis. In fact, the words *father*, *scholarship*, and *sex*, appear to evoke more general definitions from the Negro respondents.

Table 3. NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS REFLECTING A LOW LEVEL OF GENERALITY IN THEIR DEFINITIONS OF TEN WORDS—BY RACE OF RESPONDENT

Word Defined	Race of Respondents	
	Negro (N = 15)	White (N = 15)
Home	7	8
Color	11	5
Minority	11	5
Father	4	7
Neighborhood	7	7
Scholarship	2	7
Job	6	5
Slum	6	6
Sex	3	5
Policeman	5	5

INTERPRETATION

On the basis of what we know in general about the socialization of Negro children, a process which usually leaves them acutely conscious of their racial status, we would expect that any symbols related to minority status would be associated with significant personal emotional experiences. Our findings with respect to the patterns of meaning associated with two such words (i.e. *color* and *minority*) support this expectation. Additional support comes from the findings that words such as *father*, *neighborhood*, and *job*, all more or less specifically expressive of specific aspects of the Negro minority status) evoked more personalized and emotional connotations from our Negro respondents.

The failure of words such as *scholarship*, *slum*, and *policeman* to evoke differential patterns of response from Negroes and whites is probably a consequence of our selection of middle class respondents. For the most part these students have been raised in an integrated school system. There have been no excessive slum areas in Seattle even in the Negro areas of the city and repeated investigations have failed to uncover any systematic police brutality toward minority people. Obviously, with such scanty evidence as we have here, any speculation about the relationship between position in the social organization and the meanings of verbal symbols is tenuous. However, further study of this relationship seems warranted on the basis of the findings which have been presented.

IMPLICATIONS

There are two immediate implications deriving from this line of research. One of these involves the diagnosis of some educational problems facing Negro children in integrated school settings. It would appear that the Negro child coming from a segregated community comes to school equipped with a basically different pattern of linguistic orientation from that of his white teachers and his fellow

students. Academic failure among such students has frequently been attributed to "poor motivation" and to "poor home training." To the extent that academic performance is also a product of linguistic differences, if there is failure to understand the teacher because of these linguistic barriers to communication, then the provision of "equal educational opportunities for minority children" would seem to be a far more difficult task than it has thus far been considered. It will involve far more than a simple equating of physical facilities and a mechanical social integration in the class room. Far more attention will have to be directed to the problem of facilitating effective interpersonal communication.

There is a second implication in this approach to the study of Negro-white relations. It may be helpful in advancing our understanding of *cliquing behavior* in certain types of situations. Repeated notice has been made of the fact that Negroes and whites tend to form racially segregated cliques in settings relatively free of the more obvious forms of racial prejudice and where participants in the situations are actively interested in promoting more

friendly relations. Examples of such behavior have been observed in integrated housing developments, churches, and among the student bodies of integrated schools. It seems likely that the type of linguistic barriers to effective communication here discussed could produce feelings of uneasiness and frustration for both Negroes and whites when they interact. Because they appear to share a common language, members of both groups tend to explain that the social strains they experience in interaction as a result of racial differences—"they're just different from us." This leads to a withdrawal into racial cliques.

One final interpretive comment: If extensive and systematic linguistic differences are established in future research, these differences could be used as a basis for establishing the boundaries of the minority Negro community, and would facilitate the study of the minority community as a sub-system within the setting of the larger dominant community. It is apparent that the visibility criterion is inadequate for this purpose in view of the rather complete dissociation from the minority community of some Negroes who live and work in the larger community.

LEADER VISIBILITY IN A LOCAL COMMUNITY*

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The sociological literature in general indicates little interest in utilizing the concept of *visibility* for the analysis of group structure and processes. Merton's essay on the place of the concept of *visibility* in sociology¹ presents a notable exception to the earlier accounts which, perhaps unwittingly, have limited this concept to studies of racial or minority group relations.² In brief, Merton contends that visibility is for sociology what perception is for psychology, and he considers it meaningful to speak of the visibility of norms, role performance, and authority in a social system. Visibility is defined as the extent to which any of these elements is readily open to observation by others,³ and it is distinguished from its psychological counterpart by its reference to

the extent to which the structure of a social organization provides occasion for those variously located in that structure to perceive the norms obtaining in the organization. It (visibility) refers to an attribute of the social structure, not to the perceptions which individuals *happen* to have.⁴

Examination of the relevant literature suggests two alternative strategies in the treatment of *visibility* in sociological research. The first involves its utilization as an independent variable where it assumes a prominent place in studies of intergroup relations and attitudes toward racial

or minority groups, as well as in the analysis of group processes, role performance, and role definition. An example is Lemert's suggestion that a deviant form of behavior must possess "a minimum degree of visibility" if the deviation is to provoke community reaction.⁵ Lemert also recognizes the social influence to which deviants are subjected and indicates that the extent to which they are visible is closely related to the deviants' feelings of guilt or anxiety, as well as to covert symbolic processes which have some impact on their role definition.⁶

The second strategy is to treat visibility as a dependent variable and investigate the ways in which group structure accounts for the distribution of knowledge and for differentials in its distribution. It is plausible to hypothesize in this connection that the extent of visibility will be determined by the positions of both the perceiver and the object of perception in the social structure. Thus, without assuming any sex differential in the perceptual mechanism, it may be understandable that fashion leaders are more visible to women than to men.⁷

Adopting the above broad meaning and implications of the concept of visibility, this paper reports findings from a leadership study which was undertaken to systematically analyze the visibility of community leaders⁸ to the general public.⁹ No one, to the writer's knowledge, has attempted to operationalize the concept of visibility as it may apply to the study of community leaders, nor has there been an attempt to relate differentials in leader visibility among different classes of community residents to the nature of the social structure or to the positional characteristics of residents *vis-a-vis* leaders.¹⁰ This is the major purpose of this paper.

⁵ Edwin M. Lemert, *Social Pathology*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, pp. 51-52.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Elihu Katz and P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1955, pp. 247-270.

⁸ The term "leader visibility" will be used interchangeably with "leader observability" or public's "awareness of community leaders." Note that the usage of these phrases implies *knowledge* about leaders.

⁹ See Baha R. Abu-Laban, *Visibility of Community Leaders*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1960.

¹⁰ Recent studies of power and influence have primarily been concerned with identifying and describing the influentials and their activities. A brief but recent bibliography on the subject appears in Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power,'" *American Sociological Review*, 25 (October, 1960), pp. 636-644.

* The writer is indebted to the Bureau of Community Development at the University of Washington for a grant in aid of this study. Indebtedness is also due to Drs. S. F. Miyamoto, research director E. A. T. Barth and Clarence C. Schrag of the University of Washington for their advice and constructive criticism, and to Miss Camille Wrathall for her typing assistance.

¹ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (revised edition), Glencoe: Free Press, 1957, pp. 319-353.

² See Robert E. Park, *Race and Culture*, Glencoe: Free Press, 1950, p. 190; J. F. Steiner, *The Japanese Invasion: A Study in the Psychology of Interracial Contacts*, Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1915; Robin M. Williams, Jr., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947, p. 54; William M. Kephart, *Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, pp. 100-102; Kephart, "Negro Visibility," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (August, 1954), pp. 462-467; Leonard Broom, "Social Differentiation and Stratification," in Robert K. Merton, L. Broom and L. Cottrell, (eds.), *Sociology Today*, New York: Basic Book Inc., 1959, pp. 429-441; and George A. Lundberg, "Sociometry's Contribution to Objectivity in the Social Sciences," *Sociometry*, 18 (December, 1955), pp. 224-240. There is unanimous agreement among these writers that high visibility of certain groups or certain of their characteristics affects community attitudes toward them and, under certain conditions, underlies emerging tensions.

³ Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

⁴ *Ibid.*

In the present study it is hypothesized that leader visibility will be enhanced by such positional characteristics of the residents as their social participation, social class, and length of residence in the community, as well as by the leaders' social participation and the publicity which they receive. The rationale behind these hypotheses lies in the assumption that the public's awareness of community leaders is likely to be a product of the realized opportunities to participate, and of exposure to local structures which are community-wide in scope.

RESEARCH SITE

This study was conducted in what will pseudonymously be termed Pacific Town which is centrally located in the southwestern section of the state of Washington. Pacific Town dominates the political, agricultural, and industrial activities of a large surrounding area. Its strategic location is enhanced by four main railways passing through the city. Being the county seat, Pacific Town serves as a trading center for farmers and rural residents of the area. Its major industries include food and wood processing and the manufacture of clay and other products. Although the capital supply of the area is adequate for extensive development, Pacific Town's industrial and population growth have not expanded to the satisfaction of many local residents. This was one of the reasons why it sought the help of the University of Washington Bureau of Community Development in 1954-55 in trying to interest the total community in its development.

The Federal census indicates that the population of Pacific Town changed from 4,907 in 1930 to 4,857 in 1940 and expanded to 5,639 in 1950. Between 1950 and 1958, its population was fairly stable with a total of 5,675 in the latter year.¹¹ The 1959 figure, however, shows a decline in its population to 5,151, representing a loss of about 9 per cent over the preceding year. The Federal census provisional figure for 1960 is 5,107. This shows a decrease of one per cent over the previous year's population, and a loss of 9.4 per cent between 1950 and 1960. The decrease in population may be explained by the fact that the young and middle-aged tended to leave the community due to decreasing employment opportunities. Furthermore, older people tend to predominate in Pacific Town and the loss due to deaths might not have been balanced by the gain due to births.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Three Research Phases. The major feature of the design of this research is the sequence of three phases which characterized the field work. In the first phase interviews were held with a group of twelve community "knowledge-

¹¹ Washington State Census Board, *Population of Cities and Towns in the State of Washington: April 1, 1959*. (Mimeographed)

ables" who were requested to give their listings of the most "important and influential" leaders in Pacific Town.¹² Among these "knowledgeables" were ministers, businessmen, an educator, a city official, an industrialist, the editor of the local newspaper, two professionals, and a union official. On the basis of the nominations by this group a list including a total of 47 names was compiled. Over 80 per cent of the knowledgeables' 124 votes were received by 25 nominees who were selected as probable community leaders.

In the second phase of the field work interviews were held with all of the twenty-five probable leaders to obtain information necessary for the identification of Pacific Town's ten "top" influentials whose visibility to the community would subsequently be investigated. Each leader was given a list on which the names of these 25 individuals appeared, and was requested to add other names which he believed to have been omitted. He was then requested to select the ten "most influential" persons on the list and to rank them in relation to each other on the degree of their influence in the community. Nineteen new names were suggested by these respondents. Of these 19 nominees, only three were subsequently interviewed as each of these three had either (a) received a vote as a "top" influential, and/or (b) had been nominated at least twice as one whose name should be on the list.¹³ Thus by the end of the second phase, interviews were obtained from all of the 28 probable leaders identified.

Two different methods were used in analyzing these sociometric data. The first one used the total number of votes which the individual received as a "top influential" from the group of twenty-eight selected leaders. The ten highest frequencies in this instance identified the ten "top" influentials. The second method involved the averaging of the ranks assigned to each leader with the ten lowest averages identifying the ten "top influentials." The two methods yielded identical lists of top ten but the rank order of these influentials differed slightly. In no case, however, was the discrepancy between the two sets of rankings more than one and one-half steps up or down. The association between them, as measured by Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W), was .97.¹⁴

The third and last phase of the field work involved interviews with a sample of 68 community residents who were selected at random from the adult population of Pa-

¹² Although this method of selecting influentials is, in essence, similar to that employed by Floyd Hunter and others, it nevertheless "adds a 'check' on the nominations obtained from knowledgeables." See William H. Form and William V. D'Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage Among Community Influentials in Two Border Cities," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), p. 806.

¹³ A fourth person was eligible for inclusion in the list, but at the time of the field work he was vacationing outside of Pacific Town.

¹⁴ Corrected for three sets of tied observations.

cific Town.¹⁵ The major purpose of these interviews was to obtain relevant information about these residents and to determine the extent of their awareness of the ten "top" influentials. The measurement of leader visibility rested on the assumption that there were differentials among the community residents in their amount of knowledge about leaders. These differentials were investigated by (a) obtaining the resident's own nominations of the ten "top influentials," and (b) eliciting his reasons for not including, if not included, those "top influentials" previously identified. The extent of a resident's knowledge about each of the ten "top" influentials was determined by a four-point scale ranging from lack of knowledge to high knowledge including actual nomination.^{16 a,b} On the basis of the total ratings assigned to each resident, and by an arbitrary standard, the 68 respondents were subdivided into three comparable groups defined as high, medium, and low on the extent of their awareness of community influentials.

The Interview Schedules. Three different interview schedules corresponding to the above stages of the field work were prepared.¹⁷ In addition to the above mentioned data, the information obtained from the leaders included: (a) background materials, (b) their organizational participation, and (c) their evaluation of the factors which made for their popularity in the community. The residents yielded information on (a) and (b), as well as on their orientation toward the community.

FINDINGS

The Ten "Top" Influentials. The background characteristics of the dominant leadership group in Pacific Town conform to a pattern which earlier research has revealed as perhaps "typical" of the careers of community leaders.¹⁸ The ten "top" influentials consist entirely of males

¹⁵ Household listings obtained from the census of Pacific Town carried out in the spring of 1959 were used to define the population.

^{16a} Specifically, the four relevant categories are: (1) lack of knowledge about the influential, (2) slight knowledge about the influential indicating familiarity with only his name or occupation, (3) some knowledge about the influential beyond acquaintance with his name or occupation, but nonetheless insufficient for producing percepts, and (4) sufficient knowledge about the influential yielding definite percepts (both positive and negative).

^{16b} In an attempt to maintain the distinction between visibility and "the perceptions which individuals happen to have," the fourth of the aforementioned categories has subsumed the positive and the negative responses accompanied by a relatively high degree of knowledge. A positive evaluation is exemplified by the statement: he is a leader alright, but not among the top ten; while negative evaluations include statements such as: he does not rate with me, or he is not a leader. Thus, in attempting to measure visibility, the role of selectivity in attention and in the perceptual process is minimized or "controlled."

¹⁷ All of the interviews were conducted by the writer in a four-month period commencing in November, 1959.

¹⁸ See, for example, Peter H. Rossi, "Community Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4 (March, 1957), pp.

who have identified themselves with a range of community affairs. They are characterized by long residence in Pacific Town, averaging about 37 years. The mean age of this group is 60.1 years, whereas the range is between 49 and 84. They have a relatively high educational attainment as eight of them are college graduates. Occupationally, they are both stable and successful in their fields of work. Their high status occupations represent managerial positions in business, banking and insurance, and industry, as well as high positions in the local government and the professions.

Residents' Social Participation and Leader Visibility.

In an attempt to investigate the determinants of leader visibility to community publics, certain of the latter's positional characteristics were examined. The relationship between the residents' social participation, as measured by Chapin's scores, and their awareness of the ten "top" influentials is presented in Table 1. This table exhibits some definite trends and shows gamma of .59 ($P < .001$) between social participation and leader visibility. It will be observed that among those with high social participation, about 52 per cent are highly aware of community leaders, whereas 36 per cent of the moderate participants, and only 20 per cent of the low participants are equally aware of these leaders. The same trend is observed among those to whom leaders are moderately visible, but it is reversed among those residents who are only slightly aware of leaders.

Table 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIDENTS' SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS

Awareness of Leaders	Social Participation		
	High (N = 21)	Medium (N = 22)	Low (N = 25)
High	52	36	20
Medium	43	36	12
Low	5	27	68
	100%	99%	100%

Chi-square = 21.22; $P < .001$; Gamma = .59.

When the residents' social participation is measured by the number of different group memberships, a slightly stronger relationship (gamma = .64; $P < .001$) is observed between this index of social participation and leader visibility (Table 2). However, the magnitude of the association drops to .49 if committee involvement is substi-

415-443; Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (February, 1958), pp. 9-15; Robert O. Schulze and Leonard Blumberg, "The Determination of Local Power Elite," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (November, 1957), pp. 290-96; and Ernest A. T. Barth and Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Sub-Community," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (February, 1959), pp. 69-76.

Table 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIDENTS' GROUP MEMBERSHIPS AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS

Awareness of Leaders	Number of Group Memberships*		
	High (N = 21)	Medium (N = 24)	Low (N = 23)
High	52	42	13
Medium	43	33	13
Low	5	25	74
	100%	100%	100%

* H = 4+; M = 2-3; L = 0-1.
Chi-square = 24.77; P < .001; Gamma = .64.

tuted for either Chapin's scores or group memberships (Table 3). Why?

Table 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIDENTS' COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS*

Awareness of Leaders	Committee Participation		
	High (N = 12)	Medium (N = 15)	Low (N = 41)
High	67	27	29
Medium	33	47	22
Low	00	27	49
	100%	100%	100%

* Test of significance is not applicable due to the size of theoretical frequencies.
Gamma = .49.

It seems that the residents' awareness of the top leadership group is more sensitive to the *extensiveness* of their social participation rather than to its intensity or to a combination of both. For belongingness in many different groupings is more likely to have the net effect of exposing the subject to those social structures which are community wide in character and, consequently, of adding to the fund of his dispassionate knowledge about the community and its leaders. In contrast, Chapin's social participation scale measures simultaneously the intensity as well as the extensiveness of social participation,¹⁹ whereas committee contacts constitute a measure of only the intensity of social participation. This is why the magnitude of the association between committee contacts and leader visibility is lowest of all.

Comparing the coefficients of association for the above three tables, the difference between each two of them, if significant, may indicate that the residents' positional characteristic of extensive organizational participation is a major determinant of leader visibility.

Sex, Employment, Class and Leader Visibility. In an effort to test further the hypothesis of differentials in leader observability among residents of contrasting positional

¹⁹ See W. A. Anderson, "The Family and Individual Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 8 (August, 1943), pp. 420-24.

characteristics, the entire sample was dichotomized into more or less homogeneous classes. Table 4 relates sex to leader visibility whereas Table 5 examines employment and leader visibility. The available data show a gamma of .49 (P < .05) between maleness and leader visibility. This renders support to the assumption underlying the major hypothesis and is consistent with the earlier findings since males were generally more active in the social life of the community than were females.

Table 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX OF RESIDENT AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS

Awareness of Leaders	Sex	
	Male (N = 31)	Female (N = 37)
High	55	19
Medium	19	39
Low	26	43
	100%	101%

Chi-square = 9.60; P < .05; Gamma = .49.

Similarly, Table 5 shows an association of .43 (P < .01) between employment and leader visibility.²⁰ This again is not an unexpected finding since the employed are predominantly male, and thus are more apt to be well integrated with the instrumental-adaptive aspect of the social structure.

Table 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIDENTS' EMPLOYMENT AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS

Awareness of Leaders	Employment	
	Employed (N = 31)	Unemployed (N = 37)
High	55	18
Medium	16	41
Low	29	41
	100%	100%

Chi-square = 10.25; P < .01; Gamma = .43.

However, further refinement of these data is necessary since the category of "employed" includes a population which is non-homogeneous with regard to variables such as social participation or social class. Thus, upon holding employment constant, a stronger association (gamma = .67) is observed between visibility and white collar or upper-class occupations.

These data clearly indicate that the employed (or the males) are more aware of the top leadership circle than the unemployed (or the females), but that upper-class employees, perhaps because of the greater relevance of

²⁰ It should be noted that the "employed" category includes a majority of males whereas the "unemployed" includes a majority of housewives, some retired persons, and a few unemployed males.

Table 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIDENTS' TYPE OF OCCUPATION AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS*

Awareness of Leaders	Type of Occupation	
	White Collar (N = 21)	Blue Collar (N = 10)
High	67	30
Medium	19	10
Low	14	60
	100%	100%

* Test of significance is not applicable due to the size of theoretical frequencies. Gamma = .67.

their social exposure, are still superior to the blue collar workers in their knowledge about leaders.

Length of Community Residence and Leader Visibility. Assuming that leader visibility is normally a product of a long process of "interaction" between the public and its leaders, this study has investigated the significance of the temporal dimension. There is no implication, however, that time alone enhances leader visibility; rather that the conditions which facilitate visibility are necessarily linked with this dimension. Table 7 shows a positive and significant relationship ($\gamma = .59$; $P < .01$) between the residents' length of residence in Pacific Town and their awareness of community leaders. Thus about one-half of those who spent ten or more years in Pacific Town are highly aware of leaders, whereas only one-fifth of the "new-comers" are equally aware of leaders. Contrariwise, community leaders are slightly visible to 52 per cent of the "new-comers" and equally so to 27 per cent of the old timers.

Table 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN PACIFIC TOWN AND AWARENESS OF LEADERS

Awareness of Leaders	Length of Residence	
	10 Years or More (N = 45)	Less than 10 years (N = 23)
High	49	9
Medium	24	39
Low	27	52
	100%	100%

Chi-square = 10.85; $P < .01$; Gamma = .59.

Without denying that there may be a differential among the community residents in the length of time needed to penetrate into the workings of the community, it is likely that the nature of social organization will deny recent migrants access to adequate means of knowledge about the community. From many standpoints, a new-comer is an outsider; he is treated with "suspicion," and his social contacts and involvement are rather limited. It therefore takes, among other things, time and interest to gain membership in the "communal we" and to develop a broad conception of the community and its problems.

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Leaders' Positional Characteristics and Leader Visibility.

The object of this section is to examine the leaders' major positional characteristics which make for their visibility to the community at large. The analysis is based on the responses of the leaders to the following questions: (a) what, in your opinion, are the major factors which prevent a leader from being known to all people and groups in a city like Pacific Town? And (b) what would you say are the major factors which make a leader known to the people and groups in Pacific Town? In addition, some of the residents' free comments are incorporated in the analysis for illustrative purposes.

The available data indicate that active participation of Pacific Town leaders in the social life of the community has definitely enhanced their visibility to the general public. Thus, as the leader's accomplishments and financial and other contributions to the development of the community increase, his visibility to the residents is heightened. Henry Taylor, one of the "top" influentials, has summarized this idea as follows: "If a leader wants to be known to the people he must do something to develop the community; the fellows who worked to bring the Goodyear plant, for example, got known." A second leader, Gary Webster, remarked that he became known to many people as a leader after he had actively participated in bringing the Goodyear plant to the community. At the time Mr. Webster was interviewed he indicated that he was not as active as he used to be. Consequently, he believed that his leadership position was not as high as before—a suspicion which was empirically confirmed.

There is strong evidence, however, indicating that the reciprocal relations between the resident and the leader, as incumbents of certain positions in the social structure, have determined the extent of leader visibility. This is illustrated by the comment of a Pacific Town resident who was highly aware of community leaders. In justifying his selection of a certain group of ten community leaders, he said:

I see them (the nominees) work on committees, commission work, youth work, city planning, school projects, and elections. I observe them in Kiwanis Club. I see them more often, and I see them in action more often than others.

The remarks of another resident of the community may further illustrate the dependence of leader visibility on the social participation of the leader, and on the location of and "interaction" between the perceiver and the object of perception. This respondent indicated that she had nominated Robert Jordan (a "top" influential) because at a P.T.A. meeting which she attended he had stood out as a dominant figure. She also learned then that he was active in the local Chamber of Commerce. Later, while attending a community event she observed him playing an im-

portant role. These experiences led her to conclude that Mr. Jordan was a leader.

In addition to the above, over one-half of the leaders emphasized in their responses the role which the media of mass communication played in enhancing their visibility to the public. The close association between leader visibility and the publicity which the leaders receive, or between visibility and an effective communication line between the leaders and the residents is shown in the remarks of these leaders. For example, one leader indicated that in order for a leader to be visible in the community, "he should bring his views to the public; he should show some aggressiveness, and he should speak up in public meetings." Another leader who perceived direct public contact as being desirable, said: "I am not F.D.R. on the microphone, I know my shortcomings in this respect, but I have a lot of ideas and I try to get them through to the public." Correlatively, several community residents referred to the radio, the press, and the mass meetings as sources of information about local influentials.

Finally, about 50 per cent of the leaders believe that their visibility to the community is co-determined by possessing certain personality traits which ordinarily characterize the behavior of leaders. Their list, for example, includes traits such as aggressiveness, outgoing personality, ability, and willingness to assume responsibility. Some of the residents' comments lend support to this belief and suggest that the factors which aid in the differentiation of leaders are also relevant to leader visibility.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study, an attempt has been made to utilize the more extended meaning of the concept of *visibility* for the analysis of authority in a local community setting. The findings indicate that leader visibility is determined by the positions of both the perceiver and the object of perception in the social structure, and by the interactive effect of one on the other. Factors such as the residents' social participation, social class, sex, and length of community residence are associated with leader visibility to the extent that they provide the occasion to perceive the structure of the dominant leadership group. Similarly, the extent of leaders' manifest involvement in community affairs, certain of their personality traits, and the publicity which they

receive are significant co-determinants of the public's awareness of its leaders.

What this suggests is that any given leader or group of leaders can be visible to some residents but not to others. This brings into focus an important consideration: the exercise of leadership "behind-the-scenes." Some social scientists have criticized this phrase on logico-theoretical and methodological grounds,²¹ while others have reiterated it in their writings.²² It is the writer's belief that a differential exists among leaders in the extent of their visibility to the public, and that the lack of awareness of authority is a function of position in the social structure of both the resident and the leader. The term "leadership behind-the-scenes," however, has seemingly implied: (a) a limitation on the range of determinants of leader visibility to the positional characteristics of only the leader, (b) an evil, or a selfish motive underlying the exercise of leadership, or (c) an infeasibility of identifying the "behind-the-scenes" manipulators.

As none of these implications are exhaustive of all relevant phenomena, it is suggested here to utilize the term "differential visibility in the exercise of leadership" for understanding those aspects of influence which are not readily open to observation by the majority of the public. The expression of "differential visibility" escapes the logical difficulties associated with the previous term (behind-the-scenes), and has the added advantage of being theoretically relevant. Merton, for example, suggests that "differing social structures *require*, for their effective operation, differing degrees of visibility."²³ If this be true, a whole new area of research is worthy of note.

The utility of the more extended meaning of the concept of visibility derives from the fact that it is applicable to a diversity of elements and social settings. This investigation strongly suggests a comparative approach in the study of the determinants and consequences of visibility—not only of leaders but also of other elements in a social system.

²¹ See Robert A. Dahl, A "Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June, 1958), pp. 463-69; and Nelson W. Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Power," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 796-803.

²² For example, see Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1953; and A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1949.

²³ Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

ORIENTATIONS OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS*

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Comparative analyses of scientists and engineers have demonstrated differences in work, attitudes, careers, and background. Some of these differences may be due to isolation from each other and reinforcement of traditional orientations. This might be the case in purely research laboratories or in purely development and engineering companies. However, these differences seem to persist even in organizations devoted to both research and development where engineers and scientists work together frequently or at least occasionally.

Differences in orientations create points of tension and conflict. Often the tension and conflict remains latent and is expressed largely by isolation and in feelings and expressions of such things as pride and superiority. Sometimes, however, the tension and conflict becomes manifest and creates a barrier to cooperation. In the organization reported on here, for example, the tension and conflict remained latent until a far-reaching reorganization was instituted, at which time engineering and science became two of the more important identifications around which cliques were formed.

Once identifications become organizationally important, the latent orientations tend to become exaggerated so that the lines of tension and conflict become sharper than they may be in the course of everyday life. And once the gauntlet has been tossed, there is a strong tendency for the conflict to result in unconditional surrender with, as an aftermath, some members of the losing group resigning from the organization. The nature of these orientations, then, is important both to the researcher attempting to understand the behavior of professionals, and to the administrator who is interested in anticipating reaction to procedures and needs.

The differences between scientists and engineers seem to revolve largely around identification and conditions of work. Scientists appear to identify more with their profession and less with their organization or colleagues than do engineers. This difference is reflected in the greater insecurity expressed by scientists working in organizations, due perhaps both to their own failure to identify with the organization and their colleagues and to the difficulty of evaluating research productivity. Scientists also seem to

have more elaborate facilities to work with than engineers and to be more satisfied with their conditions of work, perhaps reflecting a popular notion that a scientist must have a laboratory to work in but all an engineer needs is a desk and a slide-rule.¹

These contrasts in identification and conditions of work, as well as others, seem to be largely a function of differences in objectives of the two professions, in thought processes, and, generally, in the nature of the social relations characteristic of science and engineering. As Boelter argues: "... the objectives of research and development differ greatly, the latter being directed to the completion of a given object (system) while the results of the former may be considered as man's interpretation of nature and/or man-made combinations of natural elements. Thus the thought processes involved in performing the two functions may be different." However, Boelter suggests that in research and development organizations research often involves some development and vice versa, so that differences in orientations may be less pronounced.²

Scientists and engineers are suggestive of differences in goal orientations, in reference groups, and in supervision. A plausible hypothesis is that scientists favor goals of pure and applied research, while engineers favor goals of development; that scientists identify more with such reference groups or persons as "ideals (as models)," family, profession, that is, reference groups of a more personal and professional character, while engineers identify more with interpersonal and career-oriented reference groups such as colleagues and organization; and that scientists tend to minimize or ignore managerial activities more than do engineers.³ This paper, then, is concerned with the nature of these orientations along three dimensions: goal orientations, reference groups, and supervision.

Data bearing on these ideas were gathered in a ques-

¹ David G. Moore and Richard Renck, "The Professional Employee in Industry," reprinted in R. T. Livingston and S. H. Milberg (eds.), *Human Relations in Industrial Research Management*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, pp. 138-150.

² L. M. K. Boelter, "Some Thoughts on the Evaluation of Research and Development," in I. R. Weschler and P. Brown (eds.), *Evaluating Research and Development*, Los Angeles: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1953, p. 8.

The contrasts in social relations characteristic of sci-

³ Clovis Shepherd and Paula Brown, "Factionalism and Organizational Change in a Research Laboratory," *Social Problems*, III (April, 1956), pp. 235-243.

* Slightly modified form of a paper read at the annual meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association, April, 1960.

tionnaire administered in 1953 to the members of a naval research and development laboratory on the West coast. In a previous paper⁴ on the organization it was noted that professionals with research goals tended to identify with reference groups outside the organization while those with development and supervisory goals tended to identify with reference groups within the organization. However, professionals were not differentiated along the dimension of science and engineering. This paper is concerned with this distinction and its relation to other factors as noted above.

THE SAMPLE: SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS

One-hundred-seventy-five professionals in the organization (about 85 per cent of all the professionals) completed a questionnaire and constitute the sample for this organization. Responses to three questions were utilized to differentiate between scientists and engineers. The three questions were: (1) What is your profession or work specialty? (2) What is your position title? (3) How would you characterize your present work? As assessment, development, research, administration, service, or other? There were 54 who identified their profession or work specialty as physics, chemistry, or mathematics, whose job title was consonant with their work specialty, and who characterized their work as solely or predominantly research. These were classified as scientists. There were 30 who identified their work specialty as engineering or research engineering, but whose job title included the word scientist or science, and who characterized their work as solely or predominantly research. They were classified as a mixed category and were analyzed separately, but since their responses were almost identical to those of the scientists and equally different from those of the engineers, they are included below in the category scientists, making a total of 84 scientists.

There were 91 who identified their profession or work specialty as some form of engineering, whose job title was also engineering, and who characterized their work as solely or predominantly development and/or assessment. (There were also a few mathematicians who worked primarily in data reduction and statistical analysis included in this category.) The full-time administrators on the staff were excluded from this analysis. Thus of the 175 professionals, 84 were classified as scientists and 91 as engineers.

GOAL ORIENTATIONS

One question was directed at goal orientations. It asked: If you could achieve a wide reputation for just one thing, would you prefer to be known for: a general research idea, being a good fellow to work with, developing useful equip-

⁴ Shepherd and Brown, *ibid.*

ment, an original formula, organizing the work of a successful group, or applying a known principle to a new and important use. Two were research goals, a research idea and an original formula; two were development goals, developing equipment and applying a principle to a new use; and two were interpersonal goals, being a good fellow to work with and being a successful supervisor. Table 1 presents the results. Almost half of the engineers chose the

Table 1. GOAL ORIENTATIONS OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS*

Goal Orientation	In Per Cents	
	E	S
Organizing work	47.2	23.8
Developing equipment	26.4	11.9
Applying a principle	15.4	20.2
A good fellow	4.4	3.6
A research idea	1.1	25.0
An original formula	4.4	14.3
No response	1.1	1.1
Total	100.0	99.9

* 91 Engineers (E), 84 scientists (S).

supervisory goal, organizing the work of a successful group; one-fourth selected developing useful equipment; and almost one-sixth picked applying a known principle to a new and important use. The scientists' goal were somewhat less concentrated: one-fourth selected a research idea; almost one-fourth selected the supervisory goal; one-fifth selected applying a known principle; almost one-sixth selected an original formula (perhaps modesty kept this figure down); and a little more than one-tenth selected developing useful equipment. Thus, comparing the two distributions, engineers place twice as much stress on organizing the work of a successful group and on developing useful equipment as do scientists; and scientists, in turn, place heaviest emphasis on a research idea, a goal chosen by only one engineer, and emphasize an original formula and applying a known principle more than do engineers. Thus the first part of the hypothesis is borne out: engineers emphasize supervision and development, while scientists emphasize pure and applied research.

REFERENCE GROUPS

The reference group question asked: When you think of your own professional position, with whom do you compare yourself? Check only the categories which you think of frequently. You may check several items, or none. Categories included: others in your community, your classmates, certain individuals who serve as your ideals, all the people in the world, your friends, others in your occupation, people at your level in this organization, your family and relatives, all the people in the United States, and the people you work with. Respondents were also asked to indicate which one of these was most important.

Table 2. ALL REFERENCE GROUPS OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS*

Reference Groups	In Per Cents	
	E	S
Community	24.2	16.7
Classmates	34.1	40.5
Ideals	26.4	33.3
World	2.2	6.0
Friends	36.3	29.7
Occupation	74.7	71.4
Status level	70.3	48.8
Family	17.6	15.5
United States	6.6	6.0
Coworkers	63.7	59.5
No response	5.5	7.2

* Respondents were free to check as many reference groups as desired. Percentages indicate, for each item, the percentage of all engineers or all scientists who checked that item.

First, taking all choices as indicated in Table 2, 75 per cent of the engineers indicate occupation, 70 per cent indicate status level, and almost 64 per cent indicate coworkers; while for the scientists, 71 per cent indicate occupation, only 49 per cent (compared with 70 per cent for engineers) indicate status level, and almost 60 per cent indicate coworkers. Ranking reference groups shows very little difference between engineers and scientists, but differences in percentage do indicate that engineers place greater emphasis on status level, community, and friends, while scientists place greater emphasis on classmates and ideals.

Table 3. MOST IMPORTANT REFERENCE GROUPS OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS*

Reference Groups	In Per Cents	
	E	S
Community	2.2	2.4
Classmates	1.1	4.8
Ideals	11.0	14.3
World	1.1	0.0
Friends	3.3	3.6
Occupation	26.4	30.9
Status level	15.4	8.3
Family	1.1	2.4
United States	2.2	2.4
Coworkers	16.5	11.9
No response	19.8	19.0
Total	100.1	100.0

* Respondents were asked to indicate the one most important reference group.

Turning to Table 3, which presents the distribution of first choices as reference groups, it is evident that choices narrow considerably to four major reference groups: occupation, coworkers, status level, and ideals. Comparing the percentages for this table, engineers place greater emphasis on status level and coworkers, and scientists greater emphasis on occupation and ideals. However, the percentage differences are relatively small except for status level, where 15.4 per cent of the engineers and only 8.3 per cent of the scientists indicate it is most important. Though the differences in percentage between engineers and scientists

are relatively small, from both tables the pattern of reference group choices appears fairly clear: engineers tend to be oriented toward the organization, and scientists toward the profession.

SUPERVISION

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were now or ever had been a project engineer, a project manager, section head (lowest level supervisor), or branch head (next highest supervisor). In Table 4 the results are presented, in which project engineer and project manager

Table 4. SUPERVISORY POSITIONS HELD BY ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS, IN PERCENTAGE*

Supervisory Position	Per Cent	
	E	S
Temporary	23.1	16.7
Permanent	54.9	42.8
None	22.0	40.5
Total	100.0	100.0

* Temporary included project engineer and project manager; permanent included section head and branch head. Some permanent supervisors had also been or were at the time project engineers or project managers.

are combined for a temporary supervisor category (such projects lasted from a few weeks to several months and occasionally longer than a year), and section heads (in charge of four to twelve men usually) and branch heads (in charge of several sections) are combined for a permanent supervisory category.

Considerably higher percentages of engineers than scientists had been both temporary and permanent supervisors, with only 22 per cent of the engineers never having occupied either position contrasted with 40.5 per cent of the scientists. Thus, in terms of formal supervision, this indicates that engineers are more active than scientists, but it is not quite clear whether this is only a function of the nature of the organization or whether it is a function of occupational orientation.

Respondents were also asked a series of sociometric questions, including three questions which dealt with supervision: (1) Now think of all the Branch Heads in (the organization) whom you know. In your opinion, among the Branch heads: (a) who performs best the job of Branch Head, as you understand it? and (b) whom would you most like to have as a Branch Head? (2) Now think of all the people in (the organization) whom you know personally, or by reputation. In your opinion, within the (organization): Whom would you most like to have as a supervisor? Respondents were asked to indicate their first and second choices.

Data were tabulated separately for each of the three questions. There was a high intercorrelation among choices on each of the three criteria. Choices on all three criteria

were summed to derive a measure of personal preference as a supervisor. The summed choices are presented in Table 5. In interpreting this table it is important to keep

Table 5. SOCIOMETRIC CHOICES FOR SUPERVISOR GIVEN AND RECEIVED BY ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS, IN PERCENTAGES*

		Choices Received		
		E	S	
Choices Given	E	79.1	20.9	N = 349 choices
	S	37.7	62.3	N = 239 choices

* Respondents were asked to indicate first and second choices on three criteria for supervisor. Total number of possible choices was 6N, or 546 for engineers (91) and 504 for scientists (84). Some respondents selected only a first choice, and a few selected none at all, so that the total number of choices was less than the total possible.

in mind that 19 per cent of the scientists but only 8.8 per cent of the engineers did not answer these questions. Thus the results are not as clearcut as they would be with more complete responses. As Table 5 indicates, engineers tended to select other engineers as respected or preferred supervisors, and scientists other scientists. However, only 20.9 per cent of the engineers' choices were directed at scientists whereas 37.7 per cent of the scientists' choices were directed at engineers. Thus scientists select engineers as respected or preferred supervisors almost twice as much as engineers select scientists. Further corroboration of the greater respect and preference for engineers as supervisors is provided by comparing the choices of engineers and scientists for the most popular engineers and scientists. Taking the five engineers selected most often by other engineers, only one is among the five engineers selected most often by scientists; and taking the five scientists selected most often by other scientists, four are among the five scientists selected most often by engineers. This discrepancy of choice popularity is consistent with the idea that engineers are more cognizant of supervision than scientists, since when engineers do select scientists as respected or preferred supervisors they select persons who are also most popular among scientists, but scientists do not select the engineers who are most popular among other engineers.

The pattern of sociometric choices on supervisory criteria, thus, lends credence to the notion that scientists tend to minimize or ignore managerial activities more than do engineers.

DISCUSSION

The data may be summarized in the following form: there is a fair degree of similarity in the orientations of engineers and scientists, but they differ chiefly in that engineers are oriented more toward the organization, emphasizing coworkers, supervision, and development, while scientists are oriented more toward the profession, emphasizing occupation, persons who serve as ideals, and research. These orientations suggest that engineers are

"locals" and scientists are "cosmopolitans."⁵ That is, engineers are oriented towards the immediate situation for status validation, whereas scientists are oriented more toward a wider public for status validation. Thus it may be easier to transform an engineer into an "organization man" than a scientist, for the scientist may not be willing to let his status be validated solely or even significantly by the organization.

If this be the case, and if we accept the idea that an organization needs both loyalty and expertise,⁶ then a serious dilemma for the organization of research and development is presented. The trend toward bureaucracy in and formal organization of research and development has encountered a formidable barrier: loyalty and expertise for the engineer apparently can be successfully transformed from the occupation as a whole to the organization without damaging too greatly the engineer's self-identity, but loyalty and expertise for the scientist apparently can be transformed only at the cost of the scientist's self-identity. And if the scientist becomes an "organization man" he may forfeit the expertise needed to validate his professional status and may find his work transformed in practice from research to development.

The existence of this transformation of the scientist from "professional man" to "organization man" and of the relatively easy commitment of the engineer to the organization is indicated by an analysis of organizational experience. This organization had achieved a reputation for research which continued to be an important goal, though development had been emphasized increasingly in the few years preceding this study. Scientists were attracted to the organization, but the average length of time with the organization was considerably greater for engineers than scientists, with 48.36 per cent of the engineers as compared with 34.52 per cent of the scientists having been with the organization four years or more.

If organizational experience does operate as a significant variable, then controlling for experience should decrease the correlations in tables 1, 3, and 4.⁷ For engineers, organizational experience⁸ has very little effect on their goal

⁵ Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in R. K. Merton, L. Broom, and L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (eds.), *Sociology Today*, New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 411-417. See also the discussion of "specialist" or "science" and "institutional" orientations by Donald C. Pelz, "Some Social Factors Related to Performance in a Research Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1 (December, 1956), pp. 310-325.

⁶ Gouldner, *ibid.*

⁷ Table 2 is omitted from these cross tabulations since the data are very similar to Table 3.

⁸ Organizational experience was trichotomized into low, less than 2 years; medium, 2 years to 3 years, 11 months; and high, 4 years or more. Distribution of experience was: low, E = 14.28 per cent, S = 23.18 per cent; medium, E = 37.36 per cent, S = 41.67 per cent; and high, E = 48.36 per cent, S = 34.52 per cent. Organizational experience refers only to time in this organization, and not to experience elsewhere. Thus, earlier, low experience people might or might not have had a good deal of experience elsewhere.

orientations. For scientists, however, organizational experience has considerable effect: a general research idea and an original formula are chosen much less often and organizing work and applying a known principle are chosen much more often by those with greater experience.

With respect to reference groups, occupation and status level remain important to engineers, with coworkers and ideals becoming increasingly important to the more experienced persons, and with coworkers becoming the most important to those with high experience. To scientists, occupation and ideals remain important reference groups, with coworkers becoming important only to those with medium experience, and status level emphasized only by those with high experience.

The data on supervision and experience clarify the general finding that more engineers are supervisors than scientists. This difference is due primarily to two factors: (1) there were approximately twice as many low experience scientists in non-supervisory positions as low experience engineers; and (2) there were considerably more medium experience engineers in temporary positions than medium experience scientists. The first factor seems to be due mostly to recruiting problems: scientists with reputations and experience elsewhere were difficult to recruit, thus more young and inexperienced scientists than engineers were likely to be hired. The second factor seems to be due mostly to the fact that more temporary projects dealt with development and assessment than with research.

These data support the notion that scientists' orientations shift more with organizational experience than do engineers' orientations. Of course, it is possible that scientists whose orientations differ considerably from engineers' orientations leave the organization, a selective factor, or it is possible that scientists' orientations change as socialization forces operate within the organization, a

transforming factor. These data do not enable us to say which factor is at work and to what extent. But the conclusion is clear regardless of the process: organizational experience affects scientists' orientations more than engineers' orientations, and is directly related to similarity of orientations of scientists with those of engineers. Even here, however, there is still a difference between the orientations of scientists and engineers.

The implication of these remarks and the data in this paper for the organization of research and development activities is that the traditional organizational model in industry and business may not be applied effectively for the organization of scientists, nor perhaps of engineers who are engaged solely or primarily in research, but may be effective for the organization of engineers and scientists who are oriented toward application and development. Private industry today is bemoaning the fact that many leading scientists and researchers are in universities, colleges, and to some degree government agencies, in spite of what private industry sees as very attractive inducements. These inducements, however, are not sufficient inducements to the scientist, for even though he is attracted to the high income and elaborate facilities that private industry offers, he is as much or more attracted to the wider public of professional validation which is apparently not obtainable in private industry to the degree that it is in universities, colleges, and, to some degree, government service.

At the present time, it appears most likely that private industry and business and perhaps government agencies can promote research much more effectively through subsidies in the form of grants and fellowships to universities and colleges than in establishing organizational units devoted to research, unless they modify traditional organizational practices to take into account the "professional man" as well as the "organization man."

LAWYERS IN POLITICS: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON STATE LEGISLATORS*

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ORIENTATION

Lawyers constitute a large proportion of American politicians at all levels and in all branches of government, and in many other kinds of political organizations.¹ No other occupational grouping, so narrowly defined, even approaches the representation of lawyers in politics. Any over-representation of one occupational grouping in politics, whatever and how obvious the reasons may be, suggests the possibility that the impact upon politics of this grouping may differ from that of other categories of participants. It has been observed, of course, that the lawyer has special skills which make it particularly easy for him to participate in politics.² Legal practice itself has a highly political nature; and it is a uniquely flexible occupation which lends itself to varied demands of time, effort, and movement. But the implication seems only to be that there exists a general political role which lawyers fulfill naturally; others fulfill the role also, but it does not come as naturally.³

My notion is that by virtue of training, experience, and perhaps a prior process of selectivity, the lawyer is apt to behave differently in the political arena than the non-lawyer. Many lawyers in their professional roles, as well as by explicit training, learn to identify with a succession

of clients whose claims and requirements put each lawyer on opposite sides of the same fence within short time sequences. This kind of experience could affect the ideology and role behavior of lawyers in politics. It may tend to weaken their ideologies and increase their flexibility in choosing goals. The role played by the lawyer is perhaps exemplified by the maxim that "a good lawyer is one who tells his client how to do something, and not what he is unable to do." Carried over into politics this approach would tend to make the lawyer more willing to operate in terms of any set of policy formulations. He becomes in general less goal-oriented and more means-oriented than the non-lawyer. And associated with a greater means-orientation may be less affect and ego-involvement in politics; for it is with respect to goals that the greatest degree of affect and ego-involvement may be aroused. Low affect is also suggested by the nature of conflict in law practice; it is not structured in terms of "right" and "wrong" but in terms of "winning" and "losing,"⁴ and the lawyer is accustomed to a situation in which "half of all cases are lost." Thus the lawyer may more readily play the role of compromiser in politics. He may be more willing and more able to represent diverse interests. With large numbers of lawyers in both major political parties, this may be an extremely significant factor affecting the nature of the American political process.⁵

These, in brief, are some of the orienting considerations which point to the importance of studying the impact of lawyers in politics.⁶ One ready avenue of exploration would seem to be analysis of the available biographical materials on state legislators to determine whether there are any differences in background factors between lawyers and non-lawyers which are suggestive of basic role differences

* I am indebted to Robert E. Agger, whose imagination stimulated several of his contemporaries at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences to explore a number of aspects of lawyers in politics. Any good ideas and some felicitous phrasings in this paper probably originated with him.

¹ Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954, pp. 28-32.

² For a classic sociological treatment, see Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford, 1946.

³ In some completely unsystematic and highly selective observations I have noticed that the lawyer starts with this advantage in the candidate selection process. When names are brought up for consideration, no question is raised about the qualifications of a lawyer. It is taken for granted that he has the qualifications. On the other hand, qualifications generally are involved in the discussion of non-lawyer potential candidates. Thus, I have observed a discussion about a lawyer only recently out of law school and a college professor of many years. The discussion about the young lawyer was entirely in terms of his personal characteristics, "connections," and estimates of his voter appeal. The discussion about the college professor was in fact an argument as to whether he had specialized experience which merited his selection.

⁴ Or as Herbert Gans has pointed out in a personal communication, "It's legal if you can get away with it and illegal if you can't."

⁵ It should be clearly understood that my emphasis is upon the style of politics rather than its content. For a recent empirical study which tends to confirm the appropriateness of this emphasis in relation to lawyers, see David R. Derge, "The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the American State Legislature," *Journal of Politics*, 21:3 (August, 1959), pp. 408-433.

⁶ For a detailed treatment, see Robert E. Agger, "Lawyers in Politics: The Starting Point for a New Research Program," *Temple Law Quarterly*, 29:4 (Summer, 1956), pp. 434-452.

in politics. I am, of course, especially interested in anything which may suggest role differences which are *not* a reflection of legal skills and the economics of legal practice.

SOURCE OF DATA

Several selected state legislatures were chosen because these represent fairly comparable institutions in diverse political settings and in which large numbers of lawyers and non-lawyers are playing more or less the same *formal* role.⁷ For purposes of this exploratory research, lawyers have been treated as a single social grouping even though distinctions in terms of *types* of lawyers may be more appropriate. It seems obvious, for example, that some lawyers are using the state legislature for purposes of their law career while others are using it for purposes of a further political career. However, it is partly a matter of research strategy to start with the broader occupational grouping and partly a matter of uncertainty at this point about proper indices to be used in a more refined analysis.

The data upon which this exploratory analysis is based have come from the legislative directories or registers which all states publish. These are unsatisfactory in many respects. There is no consistency in the amount of detail on state legislators from state to state. Some states seem to have collected the data by using a more or less standard form; in other states it appears as if one general open-ended question was used which was probed in some cases and not in others. Only a minimum amount of data can be obtained from these sources, and it may well be the least significant and interesting. However, these sources provide a base-line from which to begin more intensive study; and possibly they can be of heuristic value.

The major shortcoming is that legislative directories which contain more than the barest minimum of demographic data report only what persons want said about themselves. In particular, the report of occupation can be quite unreliable if taken at face value. For example, in farm states there appears to be some tendency for farm *owners* to list themselves as farmers even though they do not live on a farm, their major income does not come from farming, and their primary occupation is not farming.⁸ Since my original considerations involve the effects of law training, I have classified as lawyers all legislators who, it could be determined, had completed law school or who listed themselves as lawyers or for whom there existed other

fairly definite evidences that he is a lawyer, such as, for example, membership in a bar association or service as city attorney.

FINDINGS

The proportion of lawyers in the state legislatures varies roughly between one-fifth and one-half; in only a very few instances do they fall outside these limits. The variation in the proportion of lawyers varies over time within states as greatly as between states at any given time. There seems to be no consistency whatsoever in the differences between farm states and more urban states in the proportion of lawyer legislators. Regionally there seems to be some tendency toward more lawyers in Southern legislatures and fewer lawyers in Far Western legislatures. The South also tends to show more stability over time in the proportion of lawyers.⁹

Since factionalism is probably greater in the South—everybody has to crowd into one party—it seems significant that there are more lawyers in the legislatures. This fits the notions about the possible greater readiness and adeptness of the lawyer to represent more diverse interests.

In one Midwestern farm state the fluctuations in the lawyer-farmer ratio from legislative session to session over a 27 year period ending in 1950 have been followed. The ratio varies from three times as many farmers as lawyers to a solid plurality of lawyers. This ratio follows closely the variation in farm prices. During periods of economic prosperity for farmers the proportion of lawyers serving in the legislature tends to be high with correspondingly fewer farmers. During periods of economic recession or depression on the farm, the proportion of farmers is relatively higher. When the economic condition of the farmer was poorest, there was the greatest number of farmers and least number of lawyers serving as legislators. When the farmer was enjoying his most prosperous period, there was the least number of farmer-legislators and the greatest number of lawyer-legislators. In a second Midwestern state, if we eliminate the legislators from the one dominant urban county in the state, the same trend of fluctuation of the lawyer-farmer ratio can be found.

Although a causal relationship between economic conditions and the lawyer-farmer ratio has certainly not been established, the finding—if it can be shown to hold generally—leads to interesting speculation. It may be that the lawyer's representation of diverse interest groups tends to be displaced by special interest group representatives

⁷ The following states were investigated for varying periods between 1919 and 1950: Alabama, California, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington.

⁸ My favorite example is the legislator in a Midwestern state who is listed as a farmer and who also lists a pharmacy degree. A little checking revealed that in the town which is listed as his residence there is a drugstore bearing his name and of which he is listed as proprietor.

⁹ A note of caution must be introduced with respect to these variations or lack of variations between states. No control has been exercised in the analysis in terms of the available supply of lawyers in the different states. It could be, for example, that in states with smaller proportions of lawyers in the legislature, there are relatively fewer lawyers resident in the state. Or, it could be that consistent differences have been obscured by not taking account of the relative number of lawyers in the several states.

when the special interest group faces a crisis and is seeking some form of legislative aid. In "good times" politics is left to the lawyer. Thus, to some extent, the heavy participation of lawyers may represent a lack of political motivation on the part of other occupational groupings.

One consistent finding from state to state is that the Senates invariably contain a greater proportion of lawyers than the lower houses. Since in almost all cases the State Senator represents a larger constituency than do his House colleagues, this supports further the suggestions about the lawyers' greater facility in gaining the support of diverse interests. The less localized the area of representation, perhaps the greater the necessary manipulative skill and willingness to compromise among conflicting interests to secure nomination and election.

The most marked and consistent difference between lawyers and non-lawyers is in terms of age. The typical pattern of age distribution in a legislature is one in which almost twice as many lawyers are below 50 as are above 50, while non-lawyers tend to split about evenly above and below 50. More than a third of the lawyers are usually below 40; less than a fifth of the non-lawyers are below 40. Less than 10 per cent of the lawyers are ever above 60. At least 20 per cent of the non-lawyers are over 60, and sometimes there have been as many as one-third over 60.

Despite the fact that the lawyer tends to reach the legislature at a markedly earlier age, he is more apt to have held some other political office at the city and county level before coming to the legislature than the non-lawyer. Although the data in the directories are not good on this matter, I would estimate that somewhere in the neighborhood of two-thirds of the lawyers were less than 40 in their *first* political office; while less than one-third of the non-lawyers were under 40 when they attained their *first* political office. Clearly the indication seems to be that the lawyer typically enters politics, or at least political office, at an earlier age, gets to the state legislature still at an early age, and does not tend to remain there beyond two or three sessions.¹⁰

These age differences between lawyers and non-lawyers could be nothing more than a reflection of differences between the economics of legal practice and that of other occupations. However, the advantage of youth that lawyers enjoy at this point in the political hierarchy has definite implications for moving up the political ladder.

¹⁰ Non-lawyers do not tend to remain in the legislature longer, but since they have come into the legislature at a considerably older age, they are more likely to be retiring from politics when they leave the legislature.

In other respects on which lawyers and non-lawyers could be compared from available biographical data, no marked differences and nothing that held up regionally were found. There is perhaps a slight tendency among lawyers to indicate higher-status religious affiliation; and there may also be a slightly greater tendency among lawyers to omit mention of religious affiliation.¹¹ As a group, lawyers, of course, have more formal education than non-lawyers.

One finding points clearly to the differences between lawyers who go into politics and those who do not. Fully nine out of every ten lawyers in the state legislatures received their law training at a law school within the state. Very few hold law degrees from nationally-oriented schools such as Harvard or Yale. Where there exist more than one law school in the state, a disproportionate number of the lawyers seem to come from the school which would generally be judged inferior and more locally-oriented.

One final finding in this exploration seems worth noting. In looking for evidence of role differences in data provided by the various state registers, a most obvious source is the make-up of the legislative committees. It may appear surprising at first consideration that, with the exception of the judiciary committees of one sort or another, lawyers show no special concentration on any particular committees. However, it seems significant that lawyers have proportionate representation on committees across-the-board regardless of the specialized nature of any given committee or the even more specialized nature of any given sub-committee. For example, in two Midwestern states lawyers are only slightly underrepresented on committees dealing particularly with farm problems. In terms of politics, the lawyer appears to be considered a jack-of-all-trades; not so the farmer, he does not serve on the judiciary committee. There do not seem to be a disproportionate number of lawyers who are committee chairmen. However, since on the whole lawyers tend to remain in the state legislature for relatively short periods of time and are younger, proportional representation may in fact indicate over-representation.

Again, it seems that the data on committee service are suggestive of a special role in the political arena which lawyers may play vis-a-vis diverse interests. In sum, these explorations of differences between lawyers and non-lawyers in state legislatures seem to indicate that systematic testing of the "special role" hypothesis would be worthwhile.

¹¹ Could this be some indication of a greater tendency toward lack of commitment?

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN A CORRECTIONAL RESIDENCE

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During recent years studies of correctional institutions have increasingly stressed inmate social organization as one of the important aspects of the institutional experience affecting inmates. Several studies of inmate social organization are available. Schrag's¹ research in a state prison led him to conclude that leadership is exercised by the criminally sophisticated inmates who are serving long sentences for crimes of violence. A more recent study by Grusky² presents a different picture of inmate social organization. Grusky studied "Camp Davis," which he characterized as a treatment institution. He concluded that inmate social life is organized around those offenders who are most cooperative with staff and suggested that when treatment is a goal of a small prison, a pattern of cooperation between informal leaders and the authorities may develop which promotes rather than hinders the treatment process. Other studies by Cloward,³ McCleery,⁴ Weinberg,⁵ and Sykes,⁶ also deal with inmate social organization in correctional institutions and provide useful insights into several aspects of this variety of "total institution."⁷ These studies, however, are limited in number and their findings frequently are not cumulative.

One of the difficulties of studies of inmate social organization is that they generally fail to show the specific elements of behavior which constitute the theoretically and practically relevant aspects of inmate life, and the pat-

terned effects of these elements. While most studies in this area assert the negative consequences of the institutional experience for inmates, they fail to chart the patterns in experience by which such consequences ensue. Description of these patterns in the inmate world would seem to require a familiarity with the particular setting, and a fund of "sensitizing" concepts through which meaning might be made of the data.

The present report is based on observations, interviews, and sociometric tests at Lomo, a small State institution for delinquent boys.⁸ Data were collected over a one year period of time and more than three-hundred hours of observational data were compiled. Sociometric tests were administered monthly during a four-month interval. This presentation is an analysis of events on one living unit at the institution, Lodge G., and it deals primarily with the world of the inmate. An attempt is made to describe and interpret some typical behavior patterns which characterize this world and which have consequences for institutional goals.

ELEMENTS OF THE "EXTERNAL SYSTEM"⁹

Lomo is one of the smaller State correctional institutions designed to detain and reform young male offenders. It serves as a place of last resort for those young boys between eight and fourteen years of age whose community offenses are judged to warrant their prolonged removal from civil society. Ideally, Lomo renders its inmates capable of resuming their lives in the community in closer correspondence to conventional expectations. To this end, the institution provides a full-time academic program, and stresses counselling as a major rehabilitative device. Lomo's inmates are supposed to require a long period of institutionalization, the average stay ranging around one year for those included in this study.

⁸ The writer worked for one year as research associate at the institution on a project which extended over several years. Names which refer to the institution and its personnel are falsified. Much of the observational data were collected by "hanging around" the institution, being identified to inmates as one who wants to find out what happens to boys at Lomo.

⁹ The terms "external system" and "internal system" in this presentation follow Homan's usage. No attempt is made, however, to utilize the specific units of analysis employed in George C. Homans, *The Human Group*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950.

¹ Clarence Schrag, "Leadership Among Prison Inmates," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (February, 1954), pp. 37-42.

² Oscar Grusky, "Organizational Goals and the Behavior of Informal Leaders," *American Journal of Sociology*, 65 (July, 1959), pp. 59-67.

³ Richard A. Cloward, "Social Control in the Prison," Chapter 2 in Richard A. Cloward, Donald R. Cressey, George H. Grasser, Richard McCleery, Lloyd E. Ohlin, Gresham Sykes and Sheldon Messinger, *Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison*, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960.

⁴ Richard M. McCleery, "Communication Patterns as a Basis for a System of Authority and Power," Chapter 3 in Richard A. Cloward, et. al., *ibid.*

⁵ S. Kirson Weinberg, "Aspects of the Prison's Social Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47 (March, 1942), pp. 217-226.

⁶ Gresham M. Sykes, *The Society of Captives*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.

⁷ A classification suggested by Goffman for those places where large numbers of individuals live together under institutionally regulated conditions, with no immediate access to the surrounding society. See, Erving Goffman, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions," in *Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957, pp. 43-84.

Those aspects of the formal order which are relevant to the present concern are the social work service, the custodial service, case conference meetings, and meetings of the "Board." These four units constitute what we have labeled the "external system." We will now briefly describe the manner in which these units are related to control in the inmate world.

The *social work service* is responsible for periodic progress reports on inmates. The agents of this service are those through whom parole recommendations, furloughs, and other inmate rewards flow as they present the institutional view of inmates to the "Board" at monthly meetings. Each social work counsellor is responsible for inmates in two living units, and each restricts his interests to those (75-100) inmates in his domain.

Another major function of the social work service is that of "resource" for custodial personnel who work directly and continuously with inmates. Custodial personnel are encouraged to discuss their "difficult" cases with the social work counsellor. They are also encouraged to discuss general supervisory problems. This function concerns the "treatment" aspect of institutional life, and it requires close contact between the social work service and the custodial service.

The *custodial service* undertakes twenty-four hour supervision of inmates, and custodians must see to it that inmates are successfully conducted through the daily institutional program. The maintenance of an orderly routine is an unrelenting burden of custodial personnel on all levels. This burden, however, falls most heavily on the men who are closest to the inmate population and lowest in the custodial hierarchy, the supervisors.

The supervisors must be able to command inmates and have their commands obeyed. Establishing such a relationship with the inmate group requires establishing a reputation with the group. The kind of reputation which is thought to be most effective for control rests on demonstration by the supervisors of a willingness, and constant readiness, to display violence toward those inmates who are defiant. A failure, or reluctance, to use physical aggression on those inmates who defy the authority of staff makes it very likely that an individual will be characterized as "weak" by his fellow supervisors who will treat him with considerable disrespect. The job security of "weak" supervisors is highly uncertain and their tenure is generally short. The threat and reality of physical force constantly face the deviant and recalcitrant inmates.¹⁰ Some of the typical acts of defiance for which demerits are gained

are: talking when the group is on silence, agitation, sex-talk, mother-talk, defiance, fighting, sex play, sex act, etc. Demerit lists are kept by supervisors for each inmate. These scores are tallied weekly and inmates ranked accordingly. Inmates with few demerits are accorded greater privileges.

In addition to their custodial tasks, supervisors function as "counsellors" to the inmate population. The "Lomo Dad System" was introduced at the institution as a means of providing a "personalized relationship" for inmates through which their "problems" might be solved. Each supervisor is assigned from six to ten inmates who become his "Lomo Sons." The supervisor's obligation is to develop a "warm and friendly" relationship with these inmates through frequent personal contact and through "counselling." Thus, the custodial and treatment functions of the institution are invested in the same set of individuals. While supervisors constantly complain of being overworked and underpaid at Lomo, they are jealous guardians of their crucial role with reference to the fate of inmates.

It is the estimation of the supervisor-Lomo Dad which is most important in initiating official action on inmates. The official fate of inmates at Lomo is largely a matter of the judgment of supervisors. Individual inmates may be neglected and left in the program for long periods of time, or they may be championed by a supervisor-Lomo Dad and thereby gain access to parole, furloughs, and other privileges more rapidly. The crucial role of the supervisor-Lomo Dad is understood by inmates, and it is one of the major sources of constraint on inmate behavior.

The importance of the supervisor-Lomo Dad is dramatized in the monthly *case conference meetings* which include supervisors, teachers, and social work counsellors of particular lodges. Seldom does a recommendation go against the wishes of the supervisor-Lomo Dad, although his desires are sometimes uncrystallized and greatly influenced by the consensus of the assembled group. Case conference recommendations represent the institutional appraisal of the inmate, and these appraisals are presented to the "Board" for legal sanction.

The "Board" is a high-salaried, five-member group of citizens appointed by the governor of the State. Its members act as legal authority for important action regarding youths under the jurisdiction of the State Authority for juvenile detention. Board members must authorize changes in the official status of inmates such as transfers to parole and furloughs, once the inmates are deemed worthy of these by institutional appraisal. Board members rarely refuse to go along with what is recommended

inmates behind the neck or along the collar bone. Outright brutality is not frequent, but does occur from time to time, and knowledge of its occurrence is severely restricted. Inmates frequently use episodes of staff aggression to ridicule one another.

¹⁰ Corporal punishment is not official policy at Lomo. Supervisors are allowed to punish inmates physically only to the extent of forcefully grabbing them, flinging them about and/or shaking them intensely. Such treatment is designed to inspire fear, which it frequently does. Official limitations on the use of force by supervisors are, however, constantly transcended in the continued effort to maintain control. Supervisors utilize such techniques as pinching

by the institution so that what originates as the supervisor-Lomo Dad appraisal and recommendation usually becomes legally sanctioned.

Some of the important elements of the formal order of the institution, as they impinge on the fate of inmates at Lomo, have been described. The subjection of inmates to a formal, or official, set of arrangements designed to "control" their behavior has been stressed, as well as the negative sanctions employed by those who carry out this task. Inmates who conform closely to staff-imposed expectations usually gain more rapid access to rewards, and greater freedom from punishment, than those who are viewed as chronic sources of disruption or "mess-ups." According to staff appraisal of inmates, there is a group of recalcitrant individuals in Lodge G. which persists over time. Their position as deviants is explained by staff largely on the basis of psychological maladjustment, though sometimes it is attributed to wilful wrong-doing. Much of the disorderly behavior of this group, however, can only be accurately explained as a different set of factors is considered. These factors consist of inmate judgments of one another, which judgments are to some extent independent of staff appraisal of inmates. These inmate prestige factors are associated with typical and observable behavioral practices in the inmate world.¹¹

ELEMENTS OF THE "INTERNAL SYSTEM"— THE INMATE WORLD

Two of the more salient behavioral practices among inmates are *victimization* and *patronage*. Several varieties of these practices are observable among inmates. Victimization is a predatory practice whereby inmates of superior strength and knowledge of inmate lore prey on weaker and less knowledgeable inmates. The ends sought by aggressors range from "getting even" for some capricious grudge to acquisition of commodities such as toys and candy. Three of the common forms of victimization on Lodge G. are *physical attack*, *agitation*, and *exploitation*.

Physical attack refers to the use of physical force as a means of attaining one's ends. As indicated above, this technique is also employed by the staff. Cries of pain and anguish from victims of physical attack, both staff and inmate imposed, are heard daily in Lodge G.

Agitation is a process of verbal abuse. The most commonly employed, stinging, and degrading varieties of agitation are "race talk, mother talk, and sex talk." Race talk is such a divisive and explosive form of agitation that staff is highly sensitive to its occurrence and quickly squelches

the offender. Much race talk, however, goes undetected by staff. When race talking, an inmate will make disparaging remarks about another, using race as a basis for disparagement. Terms such as "wetback . . . okie . . . blackboy" are commonly used to this end. Mother talk refers to slurs about the mother of a victim. Such slurs range from demeaning descriptions of her anatomy to accusations about her dispensation of sexual favors. When an inmate sex talks he makes derogatory remarks about some component of the victim's sexual equipment or about an imputed lack of such equipment and power. Much of the informal interchange among inmates in the course of a day involves the practice of these predatory tactics.

Aside from verbal abuse based on the above themes, there is another common variety of agitation among inmates which may be called "on-the-spot agitation." This entails an inmate making use of any known shameful or humiliating event, attribute, or experience to degrade another. An example of this may be cited. A small, dark Negro inmate of approximately eleven years had severe burn scars on his arms and face. He was sensitive about his rather uncommon appearance. He made frequent comments to the researcher about other inmates who called him such names as "burnt toast, pigmy, or monkey." Other similarly demeaning epithets were also mentioned.

Exploitation, the third variety of victimization, is a process whereby an inmate will attempt to coerce another by means of threat and duress. Threats of violence, of the withdrawal of protection, and of exposure of the victim at some vulnerable spot are integral components of exploitation. The usual ends sought are material goods, though sometimes homosexual activity seems to be involved. In fact, some of the victimized inmates are frequently called "booty givers" by their peers in recognition of their past or present disposition to engage in homosexual activity. Another end sought through exploitation is cooperation of the victim with other inmates who want to "mess-up" on a given supervisor. The task of supervision can be made very difficult by cooperative effort among inmates to undermine the routine.

Victimized inmates are not randomly distributed in the inmate population. Frequently they tend to be those inmates who are physically weak and have little skill in self-defense. Simultaneously, these individuals tend to be the most disparaged among their peers. The inmates with high peer prestige are typically those who are physically strong and adept in the aggressive and defensive use of their bodies. These factors constitute a natural prestige hierarchy which is very much in operation in the evaluations made by inmates of one another. Among the most highly respected inmates there seems to have developed an etiquette which protects them from extremes of victimization of one another. They do not compete against one another

¹¹ Many studies of inmate life in prisons suggest that inmate behavior is regulated by a code which is basically anti-official. No regularities in inmate behavior in Lodge G. could be associated with adherence to such a code. Patterns of behavior did appear in the inmate world, though they seemed more closely associated with prestige factors than with a regulating code.

with the same ardor and determination which they utilize in competition with lower prestige inmates.

While most of the victimization is directed to the inmates lowest in prestige among their fellows, the quantity of victimization which exists on the lodge at a given time seems to vary with supervisory vigilance and reputation. One commonly sees on Lodge G. the elbowing and punching of inmates by one another when the supervisor's back is turned. Inmates exercise considerable skill and dexterity in barraging other inmates with vicious, well-placed and painful blows during lapses of supervisory attention. Frequently this is done in a form of mock play. One inmate will begin to play with another in an aggressive manner, making sure that the interchange is associated by onlookers with friendly concern. Suddenly the play will degenerate into rapid jabs to the mid-section, head, and face of the victim. Before the victim is able to draw attention to his situation, the aggressor has fled and is ready steadfastly to deny any charges against him. Victimization is much less likely under the direct observation of supervisors because of the possible consequences to the aggressor.

The reputation of supervisors among inmates also affects the amount of victimization among inmates at given times. Some supervisors are known to run a "loose" group, which means that discipline is less rigid and that less supervisory attention is paid to inmate behavior. Inmates move about much more freely under loose supervision, and are restricted in their interchanges with other inmates much less than with supervisors who exercise "tight" control. Predatory attack on the weaker inmates is most prevalent during such times. Inmates are keenly sensitive to the extent that such behavior will be punished by the different supervisors and seem to exercise their practices of victimization accordingly. Some supervisors will dismiss predatory attack by inmates with the expression that the victims need to learn how to take it. Other supervisors continually admonish the inmates about fighting, wrestling, and other forms of behavior which might lead to overt antagonism. Some supervisors are known among inmates to punish predatory behavior by victimizing the aggressor, only much more severely. Predatory tendencies, especially physical attack, are diminished under supervision of these men. Others are more lenient in their punishment of such behavior, and predatory tendencies openly flourish.

A second major inmate practice in Lodge G. is that of *patronage*. This practice involves efforts by inmates, most notably those of low esteem among their peers, to build protective and ingratiating relationships with others more advantageously situated on the prestige ladder. This phenomenon can be interpreted as one means whereby low prestige inmates attempt to cope with the everpresent problem of victimization and low prestige. If such inmates are

able to realize a patronage relationship with stronger and more prestigious inmates, they are less likely to be victimized and are able to command some degree of respect, or nvy, from their fellows.

One way of building a patronage relationship is to put oneself at the disposal of the would-be patron in an obvious manner. This is done by such things as laughing at his jokes and assisting him in the victimization of other inmates. A second and complementary means of establishing a patronage relationship is to have available a supply of desirable goods and to shower them liberally on the would-be patron. It should be added that the reliability of the patron is by no means complete, and patronage usually expires with the expiration of the cherished commodities. This is especially true if the prestige differences on the lodge between the two inmates are great.

While victimization and patronage are commonplace in the daily actions of inmates, they are also practices which characterize staff actions toward inmates to a considerable extent. Physical violence by staff as a sanctioning device demonstrates the extent to which the conventional staff-inmate analytic dichotomy might sometimes conceal crucial events. The same is true of the common practice whereby staff takes a particular liking to certain inmates and decides to make them the object of extensive "rehabilitative" attention. Patronage of this kind by particular supervisors has a decided impact on the standing of these inmates among their peers. If the inmate concerned is of extremely low status the effect is usually to increase the show of overt antagonism by peers to the inmate, and thus, frequently, to increase his difficulties in the peer world. Agitation and exploitation appear in staff inmate relations only to a limited extent. This is usually during informal playful interchanges between inmates and supervisors.

Although determination of the precise intensities and frequencies of these described phenomena transcend the scope of this presentation, an attempt is made in the following section to interpret these conditions more systematically.

ANALYSIS

The foregoing descriptive material stresses two important facts regarding inmate life in Lodge G. The first is the non-random distribution of judgments of esteem and honor among inmates as imputed by staff. That is, some inmates are seen as those who closely conform to staff expectations and have gained staff favor. Other inmates are judged by staff to be "mess-ups" because of their continuous infraction of regulations. Staff judgments of inmates are thus seen to range from "good boys" to "mess-ups." An indicator of this dimension of experience on Lodge G. is provided by the previously cited demerit list which is composed each week by staff. Observation and

review of these scores for each inmate during a four-month interval reveal the following:¹²

(a) That of the eight inmates originally rated high by staff (few demerits) and who remained in the study through the four-month interval, three (37 per cent) were consistently rated high.

(b) That of the fourteen inmates originally rated low by staff (many demerits) and who remained in the study through the four-month testing interval, four (28 per cent) were consistently rated low.

These findings suggest that some inmates tend to be consistently endowed with high esteem by staff and others are consistently viewed as low on the staff prestige hierarchy.

The second important fact stressed in the foregoing descriptive material concerns the non-random distribution of estimations of honor and esteem as imputed by inmates to one another. Inmates generally show high regard for those who are physically powerful, skillful, and daring. They generally show contempt for weakness and for feminine characteristics. Strong inmates are usually the objects of respect and deference among their peers. Weak inmates are the usual objects of disrespect, humiliation and ridicule. The indicator for this distribution of prestige by inmates was sociometric choices and rejections.¹³

(a) That of the ten inmates originally rated high by inmates (frequently chosen, seldom rejected) who remained in the study through the four-month testing interval, four (40 per cent) were consistently rated high.

(b) That of the fourteen inmates originally rated low by inmates (seldom chosen, frequently rejected) who remained in the study through the four-month testing interval, nine (64 per cent) were consistently rated low.

As an indication of the accessibility of the designated categories of inmates to rewards the following facts are revealing. Four of the original 16 Hi-Inmate boys were paroled during the four-month test interval whereas only one of the original fifteen Low-Inmate boys made a similar departure. Of the original fifteen Hi-Staff boys seven were paroled during the four-month test interval whereas none of the original 14 Low-Staff boys were paroled. Assuming a reasonable degree of adequacy of the indi-

cators used, these findings suggest that once an inmate attains Hi or Low prestige levels, rewards and punishments are differentially available.

We have, in effect, plotted the inmate population monthly along two dimensions over a four-month interval. The population was ranked along a *conformity-nonconformity continuum* based on accumulated demerits. Position along this continuum was said to indicate staff appraisal of inmates. The inmate population was also ranked along a *popularity continuum* based on sociometric choices and rejections. Position along this continuum was said to indicate the level of esteem attained by each inmate in the total group. Aside from the above cited findings, which give some partial indication of mobility tendencies of the upper and lower thirds of the two indicated dimensions, crude comparisons of the interdependence between these Hi and Low categories were made. That is, determination of the extent to which Hi and Low staff designated categories and inmate designated categories interpenetrated was determined. These findings show that:

(a) The numbers of Hi-Inmate boys who were simultaneously Hi-Staff boys for the four consecutive months were: 8 of 16 (50 per cent), 6 of 13 (46 per cent), 6 of 14 (43 per cent), 8 of 15 (53 per cent).

(b) The numbers of Low-Inmate boys who were simultaneously Hi-Staff boys for the four consecutive months were: 0 of 15 (0 per cent), 1 of 14 (7 per cent), 0 of 15 (0 per cent), 0 of 15 (0 per cent).

(c) The numbers of Hi-Inmate boys who were simultaneously Low Staff boys for the four consecutive months were: 2 of 16 (12 per cent), 2 of 13 (15 per cent), 1 of 14 (7 per cent), 4 of 15 (26 per cent).

(d) The numbers of Low-Inmate boys who were simultaneously Low Staff boys for the four consecutive months were: 6 of 15 (40 per cent), 8 of 14 (57 per cent), 8 of 15 (53 per cent), 9 of 14 (64 per cent).

These findings suggest that the chances of an inmate with high prestige among his fellows to be favorably viewed by staff are considerably greater than are similar chances for an inmate with low peer esteem. They also suggest that inmates who are held in low esteem by peers tend to be held in low esteem by staff to a greater extent than inmates who have high peer standing. While inmate access to official rewards and punishments, as suggested above, is largely a matter of supervisor-Lomo Dads appraisal, these figures suggest that official appraisal is mediated through a set of unofficial evaluations. That is, the official fate of some inmates is seen to be associated with their standing among their peers.¹⁴

Dual ranking of the inmate population, as carried out in this study, affords a useful vantage point from which to view social organization in the inmate world. Staff ex-

¹² Demerit ratings for inmates in this study were calculated during a four-month interval. Four rankings of the inmate population were made, based on accumulated demerits. These rankings were broken down into approximately thirds: the upper-third (Hi-Staff), meaning those who collected fewer demerits, and the lower-third (Low-Staff), meaning those inmates who collected more demerits.

¹³ Sociometric tests were administered four times during a four-month interval. Inmates were asked to select those with whom they would like to be during a forthcoming activity period. They were also asked to indicate those with whom they would not like to be. Each inmate in the study was then ranked according to the number of choices he received, minus the rejections. These rankings were broken down into the most highly chosen (upper-third or Hi-Inmates) and the least chosen (lower-third or Low-Inmates).

¹⁴ It was not possible to determine whether inmate standing was related to official standing as antecedent or as consequence, or both.

pectations and inmate expectations of inmates constitute "cross pressures" to which each individual inmate is subjected. These sets of expectation are viewed as primary axes around which social experience in the inmate world is organized. Inmates who are favored by staff and who are held in high esteem by other inmates undergo an institutional experience which is significantly different from that of those inmates who are the constant objects of staff and inmate humiliation and ridicule. Likewise, the experience of inmates who are high in staff esteem and are considered of low prestige among their peers are confronted with peculiar problems of adaptation. They must employ special strategies and techniques to alter their position in the lodge setting and in everyday interchanges with their associates. Typical patterns of deference and demeanor can be observed to be associated with each of the alternative positional possibilities.

MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Sociometric and demerit list indicators utilized over a four-month time period substantiate the observation that some inmates maintain relatively stable positions in Lodge G. over time. The relative stability of those inmates who have low rankings in the eyes of peers can to some extent be accounted for, especially if they also have low staff ranking.

One cardinal fact of inmate life on Lodge G. is the constant search for, and exploitation of, opportunities for elevation of prestige level. Some, the frail, weak and physically awkward suffer a natural disadvantage in this quest. It is among these inmates that the search for patronage is greatest. In the course of their efforts to explore avenues for elevation of their level of esteem they are confronted by formidable barriers of victimization which other status-seeking inmates put before them as obstacles. One of the key factors in the success of their efforts at upward mobility seems closely connected with their response to this victimization by their peers.

A common response to the physical attack, agitation and exploitation of fellow inmates is to cry out and make a scene which will attract supervisory attention, thus affording some temporary relief to the victim. This alternative, however, predisposes the inmate who elects it to a permanent position among those inmates known as "mess-ups." These are the inmates who maintain permanent positions at the bottom of the inmate prestige hierarchy and also, frequently, at the bottom of the staff ranking. The mechanism by which this comes about is in part as follows.

The practice of crying out in response to victimization leads to the eventual staff label of "cry baby" or "immature," or of having "poor peer relations." Such an inmate comes to be known to staff as "the type who acts out"

his problems. Staff regards such inmates as "a pain in the neck" because of their chronic disruption of order. Thus, more staff intolerance of these inmates and greater imposition of demerits. Simultaneous to this is the effect that outcries to victimization have in the eyes of inmates. By drawing staff attention to such events one is also likely to bring punishment on the aggressor, which may lead to cumulative resentment against the victim in the inmate world. He becomes one who is unable to "take it" and "finks." In the daily routine of lodge life these inmates become the objects of both staff and inmate scorn. This makes them legitimate victims among inmates and the frequent objects of staff penalty. Gradually, an imagery comes to be associated with these inmates which depicts them as "finks," and "punks," and as legitimate objects of ridicule. After a time it becomes difficult for them to achieve prestige in the lodge for all possible avenues for such achievement are blocked and well fortified by the negative imagery which is associated with them and with the "mess-up" stigma which they bear. These are a large segment of the inmates who, because of their "immaturity," remain longest in custody. They are viewed as constituting severe "treatment" problems.

For the inmate who elects not to "fink" in response to victimization there are much greater chances for advancement to higher prestige positions, especially by staff estimation. This is because such inmates do not become the chronic disrupters of order and they are not to the same extent the objects of hatred among their peers. The chances for upward mobility are greatly increased for these inmates if they are affluent and liberally dispense desirable commodities among their fellows. The realization of a patronage relationship is, of course, of inestimable value to these low prestige inmates. Thus, a foothold in an upward direction can be gained by those inmates of lowest prestige in the lodge if they do not "fink" in response to victimization, if they acquire a patron and keep him happy, and if they make conscious efforts to avoid the acquisition of demerits from staff.

The relative stability of those inmates who are rated high by both staff and inmates is partly explained by staff cooptation. They are utilized by staff in the service of control of the other inmates, and they can perform a valuable staff function in this regard. Because of their high esteem and strength they are able to speak among their peers with considerable authority. They are able to perform such services as stopping fights, quieting the group down, calming down angered recalcitrant inmates, etc. Without the support of these inmates the supervisory task would be vastly more complicated, as is sometimes the case.

There probably are several varieties of the phenomenon of collective excitement, or being high, among inmates

on Lodge G. which have divergent causal backgrounds. Two factors, however, seem directly related to this phenomenon. The spread of news of "cutout" seems to be associated with collective excitement among inmates. When news that some inmate has run away from Lomo is spread there is considerable speculation among inmates. Rumors about his fate are spread; opinions about the act are voiced, and many seem to ruminate about relief from involuntary servitude. As the tension from such discussion builds up, the general level of obedience and attentiveness to staff-imposed commands seems to diminish.

Another factor which is associated with upsurges of collective disorder among inmates on Lodge G. is initiated by staff. It represents a breakdown in the Hi-Inmate and Hi-Staff alliance, and a threat to the organizational goal of custody and order. Periodically staff becomes concerned about the extent to which the stronger inmates "bully" the smaller and weaker ones. In response to this concern they usually put pressure on the stronger, who, as pointed out above, are generally the inmates of high prestige among peers. The strong and influential inmates react to this by more than usual resentment against the "finks" and "punks," who now are deferred to by staff, and this resentment, though usually not apparent to staff, ferments and subtly affects the patterns of inmate interaction. It is as if a sense of injustice has been communicated to the group. Agitation mounts among the inmates. Conflict and dissension spread. The "bully" inmates are able to keep themselves from ostensible involvement in initiating this ferment of antagonism by subtly avoiding staff attention and by relegating much of the consequent agitation and pressuring to their close associates. Over time this ferment seems to erupt into multiple episodes of overt conflict, and most of it seems to become manifest among the low-prestige inmates.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

An attempt has been made to specify, describe and interrelate two sets of elements which seem to function interdependently on one living unit at a small state institution for delinquent boys. One set of elements was composed of official estimations of inmates based on degree of conformity to official expectations. The second set of elements, generic to the "internal system," was composed of evaluations of inmates by one another. A tendency for inmates with high staff rating to be simultaneously rated high by their peers was noted, as well as a tendency for inmates of low peer standing to be excluded from high staff-designated esteem. Thus, access to official rewards was seen to be highly influenced by a system of inmate

appraisal and prerogative.¹⁵ Interplay between these designated sets of elements in the breakdown of social control was stressed, and some of the typical strategies used by low-prestige inmates for upward mobility were described.

Sykes,¹⁶ in his work in a New Jersey prison, expresses a concern for viewing inmate behavior as part of a system of action rather than as a product of personality traits or collections of individual characteristics. To this end he utilizes social roles as employed by inmates in categorizing one another, a technique suggested by Samuel Strong.¹⁷ The present report views the inmate world as part of a system composed of interdependent units. Rather than depict the system, conceptually labeled social organization, from the vantage point of cultural types, as does Sykes, we view social organization as composed of interdependent prestige patterns based on two different sets of claims and obligations which are constant ingredients of inmate life. Our units of analysis were taken as Hi-prestige and Low-prestige categories by both staff and inmates designation, and we emphasized the congruence and exclusiveness between these units. The consequence for social control was stressed when alterations of the usual patterns of relatedness between these units were made, as well as some of the peculiar adaptational difficulties confronting individuals located in particular positions. Individual inmates come and go in Lodge G. but "good boys" and "mess-ups," "dukes" and "punks and finks" remain.

The implication that staff and inmates are enmeshed in an interdependent system of social organization which has patterned and, frequently, detrimental consequences is opposed to the staff view of lodge life. Inmate misconduct, according to staff interpretation, is as noted earlier, primarily a product of psychological disorder. Adherence to this ideology renders staff impervious to the crucial prestige gradations among inmates, and staff creation and reinforcement of these by differential use of rewards and punishments. According to our evidence and interpretation, social organization on Lodge G. makes the realization of certain institutional goals impossible. Treatment is hardly possible within a system where officials and inmates cooperate in victimizing and patronizing for the sake of order. Custody, however, frequently becomes hazardous when this system is altered.

¹⁵ The important role of the inmate population in regulating access of other inmates to rewards and punishments in a "total institution" context was also stressed by Belknap in his study of a Southern mental hospital. See, Ivan Belknap, *Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

¹⁷ Samuel M. Strong, "Negro-White Relations as Reflected in Social Types," *American Journal of Sociology*, 52 (July, 1946), pp. 23-30.

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